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     My dissertation consists of three essays examining economic decision making with 
experiments in a variety of competitive and cooperative settings. In the first essay, we examine 
potential explanations for the phenomenon of overbidding in rent seeking contests by eliciting 
the smallest share of the prize subjects will accept to avoid it. Our results show that the shares 
subjects demand are significantly larger than the expected monetary value of the contest, which 
suggests a stronger preference for costly competition than standard theory assumes. In the second 
essay, we examine the influence of competitive and earned entitlement on preferences for 
redistribution. Here we find that subjects are more likely to choose transfers that increase 
inequality for their reference group in competitive settings when doing so preserves their ordinal 
rank in the initial earnings distribution. The third essay considers the effect of endowment 
heterogeneity in a hold-up game conducted in the US and China. Our results show that subjects 
are more likely choose offers that reimburse their trading partners cost of investment when doing 
so results in equal payoffs for the pair. We also find significant differences in bargaining 
behavior with subjects that suggest stronger concerns for reciprocity among subjects in China 
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     Overbidding in contests is a well-known finding in laboratory experiments, and numerous 
theories have been proposed to explain this behavior. Our experimental design implements the 
strategy method to elicit the smallest share of the prize subjects are willing to accept in lieu of 
competing for the prize in a winner-take-all rent seeking contest.  Although multiple theories 
such as joy of winning and frustration of losing predict overbidding, they have different 
predictions for the divisions of the prize that would be acceptable to subjects. We conduct 
sessions in the US and China and examine behavior within each subject population. Overbidding 
is observed across both subject populations and the joy of winning emerges as the theory most 
consistent with the prize divisions that subjects were willing to accept.  
1. INTRODUCTION 
     Competitive rent seeking is ubiquitous, and the inefficiencies associated with it have attracted 
much attention from researchers (for a review, see Congleton, Hillman & Konrad 2008). Existing 
literature on this topic is predominantly based on the seminal work of Tullock (1980), in which 
agents make sunk investments (or ‘bids’) for a chance to win a monetary prize. Since the very 
first economic experiments on rent seeking contests (Millner & Pratt 1989; 1991), overbidding 
has been a persistent phenomenon with total bids across contestants often exceeding the value of 
the surplus at stake (for a review, see Dechenaux et al. 2015). Such behavior could have 
significant implications for social welfare, and researchers continue to explore the mechanisms 
driving this result. 
     The most common explanations for overbidding in rent seeking contests assume that, relative 
to standard theory, agents are more inclined towards competition. For example, some argue that 
overbidding can be explained by assuming contestants experience a non-monetary utility of 
winning (first proposed by Sheremeta, 2010). Others assume contestants have competitive social 
preferences or a desire to maximize the difference between their own payoff and their opponent’s 
(Leininger, 2003; Hehenkamp et al., 2004; Herrmann & Orzen 2008).1  
                                                               
     1 An extensive literature provides empirical evidence consistent with these assumptions and use either or both 
theories as a possible explanation for their results (Fonseca et al., 2009; Sheremeta, 2010; Mago et al., 2016; Mago 
& Sheremeta, 2017).  
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     However, recent work highlights other theories that assume agents are less inclined toward 
competition as potential explanations for overbidding. For instance, overbidding could be driven 
by a non-monetary disutility from losing, 2 or it could be driven by an aversion to the 
disadvantageous inequality one would would experience should they lose.3 Currently, it remains 
an open question whether these theories provide a better explanation for overbidding in rent-
seeking contests than the joy of winning and competitive social prefereces. 
     In this paper, we report results from a laboratory experiment designed to address this gap in 
the literature. We elicit the prize divisions that contestants would accept in favor of competing 
for the prize in a Tullock contest. The theories proposed to explain overbidding behavior make, 
in some cases, qualitatively different predictions for agents’ willingness to avoid competition 
preemptively. For example, if agents are more inclined towards competitive settings than 
standard theory assumes (i.e., utility of winning; competitive social preferences), they will 
require a larger share of the prize to avoid the contest than standard theory predicts. Conversely, 
agents less inclined towards competitive settings (i.e., disutility of losing; fairness concerns) will 
accept a smaller share of the contest prize than standard theory predicts. As a result, these 
overbidding theories make refutable predictions that can be tested using our experimental design. 
     To test these predictions, we match each participant with an opponent for a one-shot 
symmetric two-player game in which they can either share a monetary prize at zero cost or 
compete for the prize in a winner take all rent seeking contest. The novel feature of our design is 
that, prior to the contest, we implement a random division of the contest prize that subjects can 
either accept and avoid the contest or reject and enter the contest. To elicit the prize shares 
participants are will accept in favor of entering a rent seeking contest, we provide a menu of 
possible prize divisions and ask participants to state which divisions they are willing to accept 
and those they would rather reject.  
                                                               
     2 For instance, Sheremeta (2018) notes that a disutility of losing the contest has been used to explain overbidding 
in variety of competitive settings including first price auctions (Delgado et al., 2008), all-pay auctions (Hyndman et 
al., 2012), and clock auctions (Cramton et al., 2012), yet remains unexplored in the rent seeking literature. 
     3 Hoffmann and Kolmar (2017) show that overbidding in rent seeking contests assumed to be driven by 
competitive social preferences can also be explained by fairness concerns or an aversion to earning less than one’s 
opponent. Such preferences have been used to explain overbidding in second price auctions (Kimbrough & Riess, 
2012), and are associated with higher efforts in tournaments (Balafoutas et al., 2012; Eisenkopf & Teyssier, 2013). 
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     If the participant and their opponent accept the random division, both participants receive 
their respective share of the prize at zero cost and the game ends. If they do not accept the 
random division, the contest occurs with each participant paying their desired bid and the 
monetary prize is assigned to the winner. By implementing our game with the strategy method 
(Selton, 1967), we elicit from each subject the prize divisions they are willing to accept in the 
game’s first stage and their desired bid for the contest. Because we anticipate overbidding, our 
primary focus is whether subjects demand a larger or smaller share of the stakes than standard 
theory predicts. 
     We conduct our experiment in both the US and China, and test our hypotheses separately 
using subject data from each country. As such, we can examine whether our results are 
consistent across populations with salient differences in national culture.4 Our findings are 
qualitatively similar for both countries, providing further confidence in our conclusion that the 
joy of winning is the best explanation for overbidding in contests.5 
     Consistent with previous work, we find that subjects in our experiment bid more than the 
standard Nash equilibrium prediction. They also demand shares in the first stage that are 
significantly greater than standard theory predicts. Both of these results are consistent across 
sessions conducted in the US and China. Additionally, we find that subjects who overbid demand 
larger shares of the prize than those who don’t overbid and a positive correlation between the 
amount subjects bid and the smallest share they accept, though the significance of these 
relationships is driven by subjects in our US sessions. Taken together, these results support the 
claim that behavior in rent seeking contests is driven by an inclination towards competition as 
opposed to a disutility of losing or disadvantageous inequality aversion.  
     To examine the extent to which social preferences can explain behavior in our main 
experiment, we also implement a sequential binary dictator game (Charness & Rabin, 2002) in 
each session. Here we find that subjects who exhibit competitive social preferences in the 
                                                               
     4 A large and growing literature examines the influence of national culture on economic decision making (Guiso, 
Sapienza, & Zingales, 2006; Fernández, 2011), and cultural differences between the US and China are well 
documented (for examples, see Hoefstede (2001) and Triandis (2018)). 
     5 Given the substantial variation in bids observed in experimental rent seeking contests (Sheremeta, 2013), we do 
not have the statistical power to appropriately address cross-cultural differences in contest behavior (power 
calculations are provided in Appendix C). Thus, we limit our analysis by examining behavior within each subject 
population and discuss differences between them qualitatively in Section 5.  
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sequential binary dictator game require a larger share of the prize to avoid the contest, but we fail 
to detect a significant relationship with bidding behavior. These results suggest that the 
overbidding we observe may be better explained by the joy of winning as opposed to a desire to 
earn more than one’s opponent. 
     Though our focus is on testing the various theories of overbidding, our experiment is also 
related to previous studies on conflict avoidance, where conflict is modeled as a two-player rent 
seeking contest that subjects can avoid by bargaining over the prize at an earlier stage.6  
Kimbrough and Sheremeta (2013, 2014) and Herbst et al. (2017) each find instances of 
bargaining failure when standard theory predicts success and substantial overbidding in the 
subsequent contest. The results from our experiment suggest the mechanisms that drive 
overbidding in rent seeking contests might also help explain the bargaining failure observed in 
these settings.  
     The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We begin by presenting the theoretical 
framework of the contest and the game subject’s play in our experiment and derive behavioral 
predictions from theories used to explain overbidding in rent seeking contests. Next we explain 
our experimental design and procedures in greater detail and derive hypotheses regarding 
behavior in our experiment. After stating our hypotheses of interest, we report our results. 
Finally, concludes with a discussion of our results and directions for future research.  
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
     In this section, we provide the theoretical foundation for our experimental design and 
empirical hypotheses. We analyze behavior in a two-player symmetric Tullock (1980) contest 
under various preference assumptions, and then calculate the shares of the prize that would be 
preferred to participation in the contest. Each of the non-standard preference specifications imply 
equilibrium bids in excess of the prediction for a selfish agent. However, their predictions for the 
share divisions of the prize that would be preferable to participating in the contest differ 
qualitatively across the theories. These predictions provide refutable hypotheses that we can test 
in our experiment.  
                                                               




2.1 Standard Theory 
     In this section we summarize the results of our baseline model, a simple Tullock contest with 
risk-neutral agents. Two risk-neutral players compete for a prize of value  𝑉𝑉. The probability that 
player i wins the prize depends on i’s investment or “bid,” denoted by 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖, as well as player j’s 
investment, 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗. Although the contest success function may take many functional forms (Skaperdas, 
1996), we focus on the most common specification in which the probability of winning depends 
on one’s bid relative to the sum of bids from both players: 





     𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 = 0
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
 . 
Each player’s investment is sunk so risk neutral player i’s expected utility is given by:  
(2)   𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖, 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗� =  𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗�(𝑉𝑉 −  𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) + (1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖, 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗�)(−𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖). 
Maximizing the above provides best response functions which can then be solved simultaneously 
to yield the Nash equilibrium bids  𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 =
𝑉𝑉
4, for  i = 1, 2.  Note that the superscript “S” denotes the 
bids for a selfish agent. At the equilibrium bids, the expected utility of participating in the contest 
is  
(3)          𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆 ≡ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆,𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑆𝑆� =
𝑉𝑉
4.   
     The contest is profitable for each player in expectation, but half of the prize value is 
dissipated by the bids they place. Both players may prefer to share the prize and avoid the contest 
preemptively. However, mutual acceptance requires each player to receive a share of the prize 
that yields at least as much utility as they expect from entering the contest. Thus, the minimum 
acceptable share of the prize (MAS) for a selfish agent is  𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 𝑉𝑉
4
. 
2.2 The Joy of Winning 
     While standard theory assumes agents only care about monetary payoffs, it has been 
hypothesized that subjects may also value winning itself.  Following Sheremeta (2010), we can 
incorporate this feature into our model by assuming agents experience an additive non-monetary 
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utility from winning 𝜔𝜔 such that  𝜔𝜔 > 0.  The expected utility function for a player that 
experiences a joy of winning in addition to the prize can be written as: 
(4)      𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖, 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗� = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗�(𝑉𝑉 + 𝜔𝜔 −  𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) + (1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖, 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗�)(−𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖).  
Once again, it is straightforward to solve for the Nash equilibrium bids 
(5)      𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝜔𝜔 =
𝑉𝑉+𝜔𝜔
4 , for  i = 1, 2. 
and the corresponding expected utility of participating in the contest, 
(6)      𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝜔𝜔 ≡ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝜔𝜔,𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝜔𝜔� =
𝑉𝑉+𝜔𝜔
4 . 
     Equation (6) shows that despite its positive effect on wasteful equilibrium bids, player i’s 
expected utility of entering the contest increases when subjects receive a joy from winning. Thus, 
the joy of winning predicts the minimum acceptable share of the prize is 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝜔𝜔 = 𝑉𝑉+𝜔𝜔
4
 , which is 
greater than the amount for selfish agents.  
2.3 The Frustration of Losing 
     In the previous section we considered the possibility that agents’ value winning itself. 
Economists and others have also considered the possibility that agents experience disutility from 
losing beyond the monetary loss of the agent’s bid (Delgado, et al 2008).  We incorporate this 
feature into our model by assuming agents experience an additive non-monetary disutility from 
losing the contest, 𝜆𝜆 > 0, such that 𝜆𝜆 > 0. The expected utility for a contest player with these 
preferences is 
(7)   𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖, 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗� = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗�(𝑉𝑉 − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) + (1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖, 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗�)(−𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 − 𝜆𝜆).  
Solving as before for the Nash equilibrium bids we get 
(8)  𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝜆𝜆 =
𝑉𝑉+𝜆𝜆
4 ,  for  i = 1, 2. 
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Hence, as with the joy of winning, subjects are predicted to bid more aggressively when they 
receive a non-monetary disutility from losing.  Assuming equilibrium behavior, the expected 
utility from participating in the contest is  
(9)      𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝜆𝜆 ≡ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝜆𝜆,𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝜆𝜆) =
𝑉𝑉−3𝜆𝜆
4 . 
The above shows that player i’s expected utility from participating in the contest is less than the 
expected monetary payoff of  𝑉𝑉4. Thus, the frustration of losing predicts that each player’s 
minimum acceptable share of the prize 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝜆𝜆 = 𝑉𝑉−3𝜆𝜆
4
,  less than predicted by standard theory. 
2.4 Competitive and Prosocial Preferences 
     Several studies suggest that overbidding in rent seeking contests may be driven by 
competitive social preferences (Leininger 2003; Mago et al. 2016;). Following a similar method 
to Mago et al. (2016), we can incorporate this feature into our model by assuming the utility of 
player i to be  
(10) 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖�𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 ,𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗� =  𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗� +  𝜌𝜌𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗�𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 , 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖�, 
where 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 is player i’s own payoff, 𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗 is the payoff of their opponent, and 𝜌𝜌 is a relative payoff 
parameter such that 1 > 𝜌𝜌 ≥ −1.7  If 𝜌𝜌 < 0, player i is a competitive agent that seeks to increase 
the difference between their own payoff relative to their opponent’s. If 𝜌𝜌 > 0, player i is 
considered to have a prosocial preference for efficiency and is more inclined towards increasing 
their opponents’ payoff than a selfish agent.  
 
     Solving as before for the Nash equilibrium bids we get 
(11) 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
𝜌𝜌 = 𝑉𝑉(1−𝜌𝜌)4 , for  i = 1, 2. 
                                                               
     7 To model behavior in contests with more than two players, Mago et al., (2016) model utility as a function of an 
agent’s own pay out and the weighted average of payouts for the entire group. Their final bid function is 
qualitatively similar to the one we derive.  
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Thus competitive subjects (𝜌𝜌 < 0)  are predicted to overbid relative to a selfish agent (𝜌𝜌 = 0) 
and prosocial subjects (𝜌𝜌 > 0) are predicted to underbid. Assuming equilibrium behavior, the 
expected utility from participating in the contest is 
(12) 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖






The above shows that a competitive player i’s expected utility from participating in the contest is 
greater than an expected monetary payoff of  𝑉𝑉
4
, while that of a prosocial player i is less than this 
amount. These preferences will also affect player i’s utility from sharing the prize. If we assume 
the agents begin with identical endowments, consistent with our experimental design, i’s utility 
from receiving share 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 ∈ [0,1] of the prize is 
(13) 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖(𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉, (1 − 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖)𝑉𝑉) = 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉 + 𝜌𝜌(1 − 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖)𝑉𝑉. 
By setting 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖
𝜌𝜌 equal to (13), we can solve for an agent’s minimum acceptable share of the prize: 
(14) 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝜌𝜌 = 𝑉𝑉(1−𝜌𝜌)
4
. 
In equation (14), we can see that competitive (prosocial, resp.) subjects are predicted to have a 




     Several studies suggest that contest behavior may be driven by fairness concerns (Eisenkopf 
& Teyssier, 2013; Herrmann & Orzen, 2008; Hoffmann & Kolmar, 2017). In the presence of 
uncertainty, such concerns can be modeled in one of two ways. Here we consider a 
consequentialist approach in which agents only care about the fairness of ex post payoffs. An 
alternate procedural approach is to hypothesize that agents have preferences over ex ante 
payoffs. We focus on the former because the latter does not yield clear predictions due to 
multiple equilibria “around” the selfish equilibrium (see Trautmann, 2009). 
      To incorporate fairness concerns into our theoretical framework we use the preference 
specification proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and then take expectations in accordance 
with the contest.  Specifically, let the utility function for a player i be given by  
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(15) 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 = 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 − 𝛼𝛼max�𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗 − 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 , 0� − 𝛽𝛽max�𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 − 𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗  , 0�.  
where 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 and 𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗 denote players’ final monetary payoffs. The coefficient 𝛼𝛼 ≥ 0 determines the 
disutility experienced from disadvantageous inequality, and coefficient 𝛽𝛽 ≥ 0 determines the 
disutility experienced from advantageous inequality. Following Fehr and Schmidt (1999), we 
assume that player i suffers weakly more from disadvantageous inequality than from 
advantageous inequality (𝛼𝛼 ≥ 𝛽𝛽), and that player i would not be willing to burn their own money 
for the sake of reducing advantageous inequality (𝛽𝛽 < 1).   
     Assume that winning (losing, resp.) the contest leaves player i ahead of (behind, resp.) player 
j, as must be true for all bids in the “vicinity” of a symmetric equilibrium.  The expected utility 
for player i can then be written as  
(16)  𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖, 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗� = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗� �𝑉𝑉 − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 − 𝛽𝛽�𝑉𝑉 − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 + 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗�� 
     +(1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖, 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗�) �−𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 − 𝛼𝛼�𝑉𝑉 + 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 − 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗��. 
By differentiating (14) and solving best response functions simultaneously, we can derive the 
symmetric equilibrium bid for the contest: 
(17)  𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 =
1+𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽
4+2𝛼𝛼−2𝛽𝛽𝑉𝑉  for  i = 1, 2. 
Algebra confirms that 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 > 𝑉𝑉/4  for 𝛼𝛼 > 𝛽𝛽 and  𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 = 𝑉𝑉/4  for  𝛼𝛼 = 𝛽𝛽.  Thus, inequality 
aversion implies a deviation from selfish behavior only if agents are more averse to 
disadvantageous inequality than they are to advantageous inequality, which is a common 
assumption in models using Fehr-Schmidt preferences. 
      The expected utility of participating in the contest is calculated by taking expectations of 
player i’s utility conditional on equilibrium behavior: 




2+𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽 − 𝛼𝛼− 𝛽𝛽�. 
It follows that the expected utility of participating in the contest for an ex post inequality averse 
agent is less than that of a selfish agent.  Inequality preferences will also affect player i’s utility 
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from sharing the prize. If we assume the agents begin with identical endowments, consistent with 
our experimental design, i’s utility from receiving share 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 ∈ [0,1] of the prize is  
(19)  𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖(𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉, (1 − 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖)𝑉𝑉) = 𝑉𝑉𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 − 𝑉𝑉𝑀𝑀𝑉𝑉𝑥𝑥{𝛼𝛼(1 − 2𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖),𝛽𝛽(2𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 − 1)}. 





� > 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸, it 
follows that an agent’s minimum acceptable share is less than  1
2
.8  By setting  𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 = 
𝑉𝑉𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 − 𝑉𝑉𝛼𝛼(1 − 2𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖) we can solve for an agent’s minimum acceptable share of the prize: 




The above is less than the selfish minimum acceptable share V/4, which is intuitive since 
inequality averse subjects bid (weakly) more than selfish subjects and end up with unequal 
outcomes. 
3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND HYPOTHESES 
     The multiplicity of behavioral theories consistent with overbidding is something of an 
embarrassment of riches. The predicted bids from each theory being a function of unobservable 
preference parameters, so it is not possible to refute one of the theories using only contest (bid) 
data, without refuting all of them.  However, because these theories have qualitatively different 
predictions for the divisions of the prize that would be preferred by subjects to competing for the 
prize, we construct refutable hypotheses that relates the minimum acceptable shares to subjects’ 
bidding behavior. This allows us to distinguish overbidding driven by, for example, an 
inclination towards competition as opposed to a disutility of losing or disadvantageous inequality 
aversion by determining which motive can rationalize the data along both dimensions.   
     To this end, our experimental design utilizes the strategy method to elicit subjects’ 
willingness to accept various divisions of the prize rather than compete in a Tullock contest.We 
then elicit social preferences in a subsequent task to identify subjects that exhibit competitive, 
                                                               
     8 It is also easy to see verify than all shares greater than MASEA must yield greater utility than participating in the 
contest.   
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pro-social, or inequality averse preferences. In our analysis, we can use this information to 
examine whether differences in social preferences can help us explain our results from the main 
experiment. 
     In addition, we collect data from two culturally distinct subject populations. Experiment 
sessions were conducted at the University of Tennessee (Knoxville, TN) as well as Southwest 
Petroleum University (Chengdu, China). As such, we can explore whether our findings are 
robust across various culturally diverse subject populations.  
3.1 Design and Procedures 
     We recruited 116 subjects from undergraduate classes in a variety of disciplines at both the 
UT (56 subjects) and SWPU (60 subjects). Hard copies of the instructions were provided at each 
location and the experiment was computerized using the Ztree software (Fischbacher, 2007). At 
UT the hard copy instructions and Ztree screens were in English while at SWPU they were in 
Mandarin. Each session took approximately 30 minutes to complete, and average participant 
earnings were $10.90 (USD).  
     Each session began with a reading of the instructions and time set aside for questions if 
needed. Then, similar to Herbst et al. (2017), subjects took part in a learning stage for the 
contest. Using their mouse and keyboard, participants could set hypothetical bids for themselves 
and their opponent to observe how different combinations of bids influenced probabilities and 
outcomes.9 
     Once the learning stage was complete, participants were informed that they would receive an 
endowment of 125 ECU (experimental currency units) and would be randomly and anonymously 
matched with another participant in the session. Participants were informed that they and their 
“match” would individually decide which divisions of a 100 ECU would be acceptable. For each 
of the 17 possible divisions (see Table B.1 in Appendix B), participants were required to either 
“accept” or “reject” the division.  Once these decisions were made, the computer would 
randomly select a division for each pair of subjects. If both participants in a given pair chose to 
                                                               
     9 Learnings stage bids were set using scroll bars in the Z-tree software. Win/Loss probabilities were displayed 
numerically and visually using pie graphs. Their associated outcomes are presented in a table, providing the earnings 
for each player contingent on winning and losing. For more details, see Figure A.1 in the appendix.  
13 
 
accept the randomly selected prize division, the game would end, and each participant received 
their respective share of the prize at zero cost.  
     If either one or both players in a pair rejected the division chosen by the computer, neither 
participant received their respective share and the pair participated in a winner take all contest. 
The contest prize was set at 100 ECU and proceeded in standard fashion. Participants 
simultaneously chose their respective bids and the computer chose a winner using a probability 
distribution endogenously determined by their respective bids.  The prize was assigned to the 
winner and the loser received nothing, while both players paid their bids. 
     Before the game was implemented participants submitted all decisions using the strategy 
method, stating the prize divisions they were willing to accept and their desired bid for the 
contest if the randomly selected prize division was rejected by either participant. The menu of 17 
possible surplus distributions that the computer could select was provided in their instructions, 
along with examples of the two decision forms they would later fill out on their computer screen 
(see example instructions in Appendix D). After reading the instructions, the experimenter 
allowed time for questions before subjects submitted any decisions that might affect earnings. 
     On the first decision screen, subjects stated whether they would be willing to accept or reject 
each of the 17 possible divisions (for a screenshot, see Figure B.1 in Appendix B). Once all 
participants submitted these decisions, the second decision screen appeared. On the second 
decision screen, subjects chose their desired bid for the contest if the randomly selected prize 
division was rejected (for a screenshot, see Figure B.2 in Appendix B). 
     Once all participants made their decisions, the computer implemented the game by randomly 
selecting a prize division for each pair. If both players had chosen to accept this division, the 
game ended with each participant receiving a payoff equal to their 125 ECU endowment and 
their respective share of the contest prize. If either or both participants rejected this division, 
neither participant received their respective share and the contest was implemented. Both 
participants received their 125 ECU endowment less their respective bids, and the randomly 
chosen winner additionally received the 100 ECU prize. 
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     After the main portion of the experiment, we elicited risk preferences from subjects using a 
lottery task first implemented in Eckel and Grossman (2008). Subjects were required to choose 
from a menu of six possible lotteries.  Each option offers a 50% chance of receiving a high or 
low payout, and subjects select a single lottery to determine their earnings for the task. Table B.1 
in our appendix shows the decision form for this task, along with the degree of constant relative 
risk aversion associated with each lottery. Following Eckel and Grossman (2008), we classify 
subjects who chose lotteries 1-4 as Risk Averse.  
     Once the lottery task was complete, subjects were randomly and anonymously sorted into 
new pairs for a sequential dichotomous dictator game similar to the one implemented in 
Charness and Rabin (2002).10 Each subject made six decisions regarding the payout their partner 
would receive, while their own payoff remained constant. Once subjects submitted their 
decisions, the computer randomly selected one subject from each pair and randomly 
implemented one of their six decisions to determine payouts for the task. 
     Table B.2 in the appendix shows the decision for this task as well as the responses from 
subjects in each location.  There you can see that each decision entails a dichotomous choice 
between equal and unequal payoffs for the pair. The first three choices offer the deciding player 
an opportunity to decrease their partner’s payoff below their own payoff, while the last three 
decisions offer the deciding player an opportunity to decrease their partner’s payoff below their 
own.  
     Because a player with competitive social preferences (as described in Section 2.4) would 
always choose the lowest payoff for their partner, we classify subjects that choose Option B for 
decisions 1-3 and Option A for decision 4-6 as Competitive. Since this behavior describes only a 
small proportion of subjects in our sample (approximately 18%), we broaden our measurement 
of competitive social preference with an additional indicator for Weakly Competitive social 
preferences. This category includes subjects that chose Option A for decisions 4-6 (i.e. subjects 
that refused to increase their partners payoff above their own) and Option B for decisions 1, 2 or 
3 (i.e. subjects that chose to decrease their partners payoff below their own at least once). We 
will use these measures in our analysis.  
                                                               
     10 Subjects were informed that they would not be matched with the same partner as in the contest.   
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     At the end of the experiment, participants filled out a demographic questionnaire. Following 
the questionnaire, the computer displayed outcomes from each part of the experiment and 
calculated individual earnings. Participants received their payments in private and in cash before 
leaving the lab. 
3.2 Hypotheses 
     This section describes hypotheses derived from the theories presented in Section 2.  In order 
for one or more of these theories to be consistent with the data it must rationalize not only the 
observed bidding behavior but also subjects’ willingness to share the prize.  We begin with our 
predictions for bidding behavior summarized by Hypothesis 1.  Since many of the theoretical 
“point predictions” depend on unobservable preference parameters, our hypotheses relate bids to 
the selfish prediction.  Recall that the prize was set at 100 in the experiment, implying an 
equilibrium bid for a selfish agent equal to 25 (= V/4).  
Hypothesis 1A. (Standard Theory, Ex Post Inequality Aversion with α=β):  
Subjects will bid 25 in the contest. 
Hypothesis 1B. (Joy of Winning, Frustration of Losing, Competitive Social Preferences, Ex Post 
Inequality Aversion with α>β): 
Subjects will bid greater than 25 in the contest.  
      Our second hypothesis involves subjects’ acceptances or rejections of various divisions of the 
prize.  Just as we cannot make point predictions with regard to bids, unless agents have standard 
risk neutral preferences, so too we cannot predict a subject’s willingness to accept each possible 
division of the prize. However, it is possible to make predictions for specific divisions of the 
prize, conditioned on the behavioral theory being postulated.  For example, if a subject’s bidding 
behavior is driven by the Joy of Winning or Competitive Social Preferences, these theories 
predict that they would rather enter the contest than accept a 25 ECU share of the prize (or less). 
Conversely, if a subject’s bidding behavior is driven by the Frustration of Losing or Ex Post 
Inequality Aversion, theory predicts that they would accept a 25 ECU share of the prize (or 
greater) to avoid entering the contest.   We summarize these predictions in Hypothesis 2.  
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Hypothesis 2A. (Standard Theory): 
Subjects will accept (reject, resp.) all shares to greater (less, resp.) than 25 ECU. 
Hypothesis 2B. (Joy of Winning, Competitive Social Preferences): 
Subjects will reject shares that are less than or equal to 25 ECU. 
Hypothesis 2C. (Frustration of Losing, Ex Post Inequality Aversion, Prosocial Preferences): 
Subjects will accept shares that are greater than or equal to 25 ECU. 
     If a subject accepts a share of 25, this allows us to reject Hypothesis 2B (Joy of Winning, 
Competitive Social Preferences). However, if a subject rejects a share of 30, this behavior allows 
us to reject Hypothesis 2A (Standard Theory) and 2C (Frustration of Losing and Ex Post 
Inequality Aversion ), but not Hypothesis 2B.  
     In addition to the hypotheses above, we can also consider the continuous analog of our second 
hypothesis which would predict the minimum acceptable share (MAS) to be greater than, equal 
to, or less than 25 (depending on the theory under consideration). Although our design does not 
allow us to directly observe subjects’ MAS, we do observe the smallest share accepted by each 
subject from our menu of prize divisions (see Figure A.1 in Appendix A). We can use these 
decisions in an interval regression to estimate each subject’s MAS, test whether it is greater or 
less 25,11 and examine its relationship with subsequent decisions in the experiment (ex. bids, 
lottery task, and the sequential binary dictator game). 
4. RESULTS 
     We begin this section by testing our hypotheses regarding bids and acceptable prize shares in 
sections 4.1 and 4.2, respectively. We nexttake a closer look at the observed behavior in Section 
4.3 by examining the proportion of subjects who overbid that demand shares of the contest prize 
consistent with each theory. Then we use regression analysis in Section 4.4 to test whether 
competitive social preferences in the sequential binary dictator game can explain bidding 
behavior, and whether variation in subjects’ minimimum acceptable share can be explained by 
the preferences we elicit, bidding behavior, and other demographic controls.  
                                                               




     As is often the case in experimental rent-seeking contests, we find substantial variation in bids 
for the contest across individuals. Figure A.1 plots the cumulative distribution of bids in each 
location. Here we can see that more than half of the subjects in both the US and China overbid 
and that the range of bids chosen span the strategy space. Table A.1 reports the mean bid in each 
location.  
Finding 1: Average bids are significantly greater than 25 in both US and China sessions. 
     The average bids for the US and China sessions were 34.80 and 42.25, respectively. Using a 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test, we find that bids are significantly greater than the standard risk 
neutral prediction of 25 ECU in both the US (p-value = 0.000) and China (p-value = 0.000). 
Additionally, using a t-test, we find that the mean bid in each location was significantly greater 
than 25 ECU (p-value = 0.000). This finding is consistent with the literature on experimental rent 
seeking contests and allows to reject Hypothesis 1A in support of the other theories of 
overbidding (Hypothesis 1B).  
4.2 Acceptable Shares 
     Figure A.2 plots acceptance rates for each sample population across the set of possible surplus 
divisions the computer could select. Here we can see a downward trend in acceptance as the 
subject’s own share fall below the 50 ECU. Figure 2 shows that acceptance rates for both 
samples are greater than 50% for shares greater than or equal to 40 ECU and fall below 50% for 
each share less than or equal to 35 ECU. 
     In Table A.2, we report acceptance rates for each division of the surplus (along with their 
95% confidence intervals) for our US and China Sessions. Here we can see that only 12.5% of 
subjects in the US and 18.3% of subjects in China were willing to accept a share of 25 to avoid 
the contest. Additionally, results from a binomial test indicate that the proportion of those that 
rejected the split is significantly larger than the proportion of those that accept it when their own 
share less than or equal to 35 in both locations. These results are inconsistent with Hypothesis 
2.A and Hypothesis 2.C, and provides strong support for Hypothesis 2.B. 
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     Another way to test Hypothesis 2 is to find the smallest share of the prize each subject 
accepted to avoid the contest and compare the amount predicted by standard theory. Figure A.3 
plots the distribution the smallest share accepted (SSA) by each subject across locations, and we 
report means for this measure across locations in Table A.3. Here we can see that the smallest 
share of the prize accepted by subjects in each location is significantly greater than 25 (both 
Wilcoxon signed-rank p-values <0.0001). In fact, a Wilcoxon signed-rank test rejects the null 
hypotheses that either SSA is less than or equal to 30 at the 0.1% level (both US and China p-
values < 0.0005).  
Finding 2: Rejection rates for shares of 35 or less are significantly greater than 50% in both US 
and China sessions, and the smallest share accepted by subjects was significantly greater than 
30. These results contradict the frustration of losing and inequality aversion, and provide 
support for the joy of winning and competitive social preferences.      
     Findings 2 and 3 allow us to reject Hypothesis 2A (Selfish) and Hypothesis 2C (Frustration of 
Losing, Inequality Aversion, Prosocial Preferences), but are consistent with Hypothesis 2B (Joy 
of Winning, Competitive Social Preferences). Since the joy of winning and competitive social 
preferences can explain each of our findings, they provide a better explanation for overbidding in 
rent seeking contest than the frustration of losing and inequality aversion. In either case, it 
appears that overbidding is associated with an inclination towards costly competition and away 
from efficiency.  
4.3 Bidding and Competitive Social Preferences 
     To shed more light on the findings above, we examine the degree to overbidding may be 
associated with competitive social preferences using characteristics elicited at later stages of each 
session. Our measures for competitive social preferences are derived using subjects’ responses in 
the sequential binary dictator game to classify subjects as Competitive and/or Weakly 
Competitive (as described in Section 3.1). Sample proportions for these variables and other 
individual specific characteristics can be found in Table A.4. 
     In Tables A.5 and A.6, we compare average bids and rates of overbidding across social 
preference categories for subjects in US and China sessions, respectively. We compare mean 
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bids across social preference categories with two-sample t-tests and fail to detect a significant 
difference for either competitiveness measure in either location (all p-values >0.699). Then, 
using a two-sample Fisher’s exact test of proportions, we find that the same is true for the rate of 
overbidding (all two-sample Fisher’s exact p-values > 0.342). To examine this relationship 
further, we employ regression analysis to see if risk preferences and gender effects might be 
confounding our results.  
     We report results from linear regressions with Bid as the dependent variable in Table A.7. 
Here we can see that none of the estimated coefficents associated with Competitive or Weakly 
Competitive are statistically significant (all p-values > 0.589). The only significant variable in 
Table A.6 is Risk Averse, which indicate that risk averse subjects, on average, bid significantly 
less than others (both p-values <0.056). However, our results indicate that competitive social 
preferences were not significant in determining average bids.  
     The linear regression results reported in Table A.8 are derived from similar models as those 
discussed above, but we use a dummy variable for subjects that Overbid on the left hand side of 
each specification. Here we find similar results in that none of the estimated coefficents 
associated with Competitive or Weakly Competitive are significant (all p-values > 0.686), which 
tells us that subjects with competitive social preferences overbid at a similar rate to others. We 
summarize these results below, in Finding 3. 
Finding 3: Subjects with competitive social preferences do not bid more than others. 
From this we can conclude that competitive social preferences do not explain overbidding in our 
experiment. Thus, joy of winning remains as the only theory of overbidding that can explain our 
results.  
4.4 Bids and Acceptable Shares 
     Now that the joy of winning has emerged as the theory most consistent with behavior in our 
experiment, we consider the relationship between the smallest share subjects accepted and their 
bid for the contest. Figure A.4 provides a two-way scatter plot with Bid on the horizontal axis 
and Smallest Share Accepted on the vertical axis. It shows that, of the 66 subjects that overbid in 
our experiment, only 1 subject in the US and 5 subjects in China required a share of the prize to 
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avoid the contest that is less than or equal to the amount standard theory predicts. As reported in 
Table A.9, this means that 96.7% of overbidding subjects in the US and 86.1% of overbidding 
subjects in China demand more than a 25 ECU share to avoid the contest. Thus, it appears that 
the vast majority of subjects who overbid demand a share of the prize consistent with the joy of 
winning. 
     In Tables A.10 and A.11, we futher examine the relatiohship between the smallest share 
subjects accepted and their bid for the contest in each location, respectively. Each table reports a 
Spearman’s correlation matrices with  SSA, Bid and a dummy variable Overbid  set equal to one 
if a subjects bid weas greater than 25 ECU. For US subjects, we find a positive and significant 
correlation between the smallest share a subject chose to accept with their Bid (p-value = 0.073), 
and we find a positive and significant correlation between Smallest Share Accepted and Overbid. 
These results suggest that higher bids are associated with demanding a larger share of the prize to 
avoid the contest among US subjects, and that US subjects that overbid demand larger shares of 
the prize than those who do not overbid.  
     In Table A.11, we can see that the signs of our correlation coefficients calculated for subjects 
in China are similar to those found for US subjects, although niether of these coefficients are 
statistically significant (both p-values > 0.364). However, if we pool the data across locations,  
we do find a positive and significant correlation between SSA and Overbid (p-value = 0.046).12 
The correlation coefficient between SSA and Bid is also positive but marginally insiginificant (p-
value = 0.114). Thus, it appears that subecjts who overbid require larger shares of the prize to 
avoid the contest than those who do not overbid. This contradicts the frustration of losing and 
inequality aversion as explanations of overbidding in rent seeking contests, and provides 
additional support for the joy of winning. 
     To shed more light on this relationship, we can treat Smallest Share Accepted as a censored 
dependent variable and estimate their minimum acceptable share (MAS) with subjects’ 
accet/reject decision using an interval regression. From each subject we obtain signals 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑢𝑢 ≥
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙 where 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑢𝑢 is the smallest share accepted and 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙 is the next smallest amount. If the 
                                                               
     12 The correlation matrix using pooled data can be found in Table A.12. 
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subject accepts the lowest amount available (10 ECU), 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙 = −∞.13, 14 We assume 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 to be a 
linear function of a row vector of covariates, 𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊, such that 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 = 𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊𝜸𝜸 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖, where 𝜸𝜸 is a 
column vector of unknown parameters and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 is a normally distributed mean-zero error term with 
standard deviation 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖. With the linear conditional mean function, assuming the error term has a 
normal distribution is analogous to assuming a normal distribution for 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 . Additionally, the 
interpretation of estimated parameters is the same as for a standard linear regression model that 
treats 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 as a directly observed. Thus, the log likelihood function for our interval regression is 




�)𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖  , 
where Φ is that standard cumulative normal distribution. 
     To allow for this possibility across subjects in the US and China, we define 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 = 𝜎𝜎0 + 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉 ∗
𝜎𝜎1. Table A.13 reports our regression results. Estimates for the error coefficient associated with 
the US and 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉 are provided in the bottom rows of each regression table and are statistically 
significant at the 1% level across model specifications.   
     Specification [1] of Table A.13 estimates a significant positive relationship between Bid and 
MAS (p-value = 0.051) which contradicts the frustration of losing and inequality aversion. In 
Specification [2], we build upon Specification [1] by including indicator variables for risk 
preferences, competitive social preferences, and gender. Here we find that the coefficient 
associated with Bid remains positive but becomes marginally insignificant when additional 
control variables are included (p-value = 0.141). Nevertheless, these results are inconsistent with 
the frustration of losing and inequality aversion as explanations of overbidding in rent-seeking 
contests which predict a negative relationship between bids and MAS.  
     Specifications [3] and [4] replace Bid with the indicator variable Overbid to estimate the 
mean difference in MAS between subjects who overbid and those who do not. Here we find that 
subjects who overbid have a larger MAS and this difference is significant at the 1% level (p-value 
= 0.005), and in Specification [4] we find that this difference is robust to controls for risk 
                                                               
     13 The frustration of losing and inequality aversion suggest that 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 could be negative. 
     14 Because each subject in our sample accepted at least one of the available prize divisions, we can ignore the 
case in which 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑢𝑢 may be greater than 90 ECU. 
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aversion, competitive social preferences, and gender (p-value = 0.004). These results not only 
contradict the frustration of losing and inequality aversion, but provide additional support for the 
joy of winning.  
5. Cross Country Comparisons 
     Although we do not have sufficient statistical power to appropriately address hypothesis tests 
across locations, we do observe some differences in behavior that are worthy of discussion. First, 
as shown in Table A.1, the average bid for subjects in our China sessions was approximately 
7.55 ECU higher than the average bid in our US sessions. While we fail to detect a significant 
differences in either means (p-value = 0.141) or medians (Wilcoxon rank-sum p-value = 0.128), 
this may only be due to our lack of power. To our knowledge, no study has yet compared bidding 
behavior in rent seeking contests across countries with significant differences in national culture. 
Future research in this area could provide some interesting insights into cultural difderences in 
competitive behavior.   
     In addition, although the average MAS was similar across locations,15 we did detect 
differences in acceptance rates across locations for some of the prize divisions subjects could 
accept to avoid the contest. Specifically, we found that subjects in our China sessions were less 
likely to accept splits for which their own share was 55, 50, or 45.16 These results suggest that a 
larger proportion of subjects in China prefer costly competition to a relatively fair division of the 
prize at stake. 17    
6. CONCLUSION 
     A consistent finding in the large literature on contests is that subjects overbid relative to the 
Nash prediction. Considering this observation, researchers have provided explanations that 
typically rely on non-standard utility specifications. However, since the implied equilibrium bids 
ultimately depend on unobservable preference parameters, it is difficult to use bidding behavior 
                                                               
     15 See the rightmost column of Table A.3. 
     16 In Table A.2, we report p-values from Fisher’s exact tests of proportions comparing acceptance rates for each 
prize divisions across locations. The p-value associated with these divsions were less than 0.032 in each case.  
     17 We should also note that subjects in China were significantly more likely to exhibit Competitive (p-value = 
0.028) and Weakly Compeitive (p-value = 0.086) social preferences in the sequential binary dictator game. However, 
as noted above, we do not have sufficient power to address differences in proportions across locations.   
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to choose between the theories. Our experiment has taken a different approach by eliciting 
subjects’ willingness to share the prize rather than compete for it. 
     Consistent with the joy of winning and competitive social preferences, we observe both 
overbidding, average demanded shares in excesss of the amount predicted by standard theory, 
and a positive correlation between overbidding and the smallest share accepted to avoid the 
contest. Additionally, we fail to detect a significant relationship between competitive social 
preferences in the sequential binary dictator game and bids. This suggests that the joy of winning 
provides the best explanation for overbidding in our experiment.  
     Whereas most contest experiments recruit subjects from the US, our study considers the 
behavior of subjects in both China and the US. We observe overbidding and larger demanded 
shares of the prize to avoid the contest in both locations. As such, we provide evidence of the 
cross-cultural robustness of overbidding in rent seeking contests in a way that is consistent with 
the Joy of Winning.  
     In addition to testing our main hypothesis of interest, the elicitation mechanism we use can 
easily be extended to other versions of Tullock’s (1980) model commonly explored in the 
literature. For example, the elicitation mechanism can examine behavior in contests with 
asymmetric cost functions, asymmetric prizes, minimum bid requirements, or endogenous rents. 
Contests between groups have also received considerable attention from the literature (for a 
review, see Sheremeta 2018), and one can examine behavior in these settings by augmenting the 
elicitation mechanism with a voting rule. Additionally, introducing a third party to the game 
whose payoff depends on contest expenditures can reframe the game’s first stage to examine 
collusive behavior. We leave these questions for future research.  
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APPENDIX A: TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
 
Table A.1: Bids 
 US China  H0: US = China   [N=56] [N=60] 
Avg. Bid (ECU) 34.80 42.25 p-value = 0.128 
 (3.54) (3.55)  
Notes: Mean bids are reported for our US and China samples, respectively. The reported p-value is derived 
from a two-sample Mann-Whitey rank-sum test with the null hypothesis that bids are equal across countries. 













Table A.2: Acceptance Rates 
Shares US China H0: US = China 
Own Match %Accept Std. Err. Bi-test %Accept Std. Err. Bi-test p-value 
90 10 91.1 3.8 96.4 83.3 4.8 90.7 0.215 
85 15 89.3 4.1 95.2 83.3 4.8 90.7 0.353 
80 20 89.3 4.1 95.2 83.3 4.8 90.7 0.353 
75 25 87.5 4.4 94.0 86.7 4.4 93.2 0.894 
70 30 92.9 3.4 97.5 90.0 3.9 95.6 0.584 
65 35 91.1 3.8 96.4 91.7 3.6 96.7 0.909 
60 40 96.4 2.5 99.4 90.0 3.9 95.6 0.172 
55 45 94.6 3.0 98.5 81.7 5.0 89.4 0.032 
50 50 94.6 3.0 98.5 76.7 5.5 85.3 0.006 
45 55 83.9 4.9 91.4 65.0 6.2 75.2 0.020 
40 60 73.2 5.9 82.7 60.0 6.3 70.7 0.132 
35 65 30.4 6.1 42.0 38.3 6.3 49.8 0.366 
30 70 16.1 4.9 26.4 25.0 5.6 35.9 0.236 
25 75 12.5 4.4 22.2 18.3 5.0 28.5 0.386 
20 80 14.3 4.7 24.3 15.0 4.6 24.7 0.913 
15 85 8.9 3.8 17.9 15.0 4.6 24.7 0.316 
10 90 8.9 3.8 17.9 15.0 4.6 24.7 0.316 
Notes: We report acceptance rates (%Accept) for each possible prize division using all observations from our US and China samples.  Values reported in 
columns labeled “Bi-test” are derived from one-tail binomial tests and signify the smallest AR we can reject at the 5% level. Reported p-values in the right 
most column are derived from two-sample Fisher’s exact tests of proportions with the null hypothesis of equality across countries.  
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Table A.3: Smallest Share Accepted 
 US China H0: US = China 
Smallest Share Accepted 37.1 38.7  
H0: Mean ≤ 30 p-value = 0.000 p-value = 0.000 p-value = 0.386 
Notes: The p-values reported below “Smallest Share Accepted” are derived from Wilcoxon signed rank tests. The 
rightmost column contains p-values comparing each variable across locations using a two-sample Mann-Whitney 








Table A.4: Demographics (Essay 1) 
 US China Ho: US = China 
Risk Averse 0.75 0.733 p-value = 0.838 
Competitive 0.107 0.267 p-value = 0.028 
Weakly Competitive 0.179 0.317 p-value = 0.086 
Male 0.6 0.5 p-value = 0.282 









Table A.5: Comparing Competitive and Noncompetitive Subjects (US Sessions) 
 Bid %Overbid 
Competitive = 1 33.50 50.0 
= 0 34.96 54.0 
 p-value = 0.901 p-value = 0.852 
Weakly Competitive = 1 31.40 40.0 
= 0 35.54 56.6 
 p-value = 0.699 p-value = 0.342 
Notes: Reported p-values refer to hypothesis test comparing variables across categories with equality as the null. 
The p-values associated with “Bid” are derived from Welch’s t-tests. The p-values associated with “%Overbid” 







Table A.6: Comparing Competitive and Noncompetitive Subjects (China Sessions) 
 Bid %Overbid 
Competitive = 1 40.7 61.4 
= 0 42.8 56.2 
 p-value = 0.788 p-value = 0.702 
Weakly Competitive = 1 47.6 58.5 
= 0 39.8 63.2 
 p-value = 0. 387 p-value = 0.734 
Notes: Reported p-values refer to hypothesis test comparing variables across categories with equality as the null. 
The p-values associated with “Bid” are derived from Welch’s t-tests. The p-values associated with “%Overbid” 







Table A.7: Bid Regressions 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Comp. -1.92 -2.85   
 (6.56) (6.64)   
Weakly Comp.   3.17 2.69 
   (5.88) (6.04) 
Risk Averse  -11.16**  -11.23** 
  (5.8)  (5.8) 
Male  -5.39  -4.35 
  (5.23)  (5.29) 
China 7.75 7.23 7.01 6.5 
 (5.15) (5.11) (5.1) (5.07) 
Constant 35.01*** 46.66*** 34.24*** 45.31*** 
 (3.69) (6.9) (3.77) (7.1) 











Table A.8: Overbid Regressions 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Competitive -0.048 -0.056   
 (0.121) (0.124)   
Weakly Competitive   -0.036 -0.044 
   (0.109) (0.113) 
Risk Averse  -0.094  -0.093 
  (0.109)  (0.109) 
Male  -0.048  -0.049 
  (0.098)  (0.099) 
China 0.072 0.067 0.069 0.064 
 (0.095) (0.096) (0.094) (0.095) 
Constant 0.541*** 0.641*** 0.542*** 0.642*** 
 (0.068) (0.129) (0.07) (0.131) 







Table A.9: Smallest Accepted Shares if Bid > 25 (66 obs.) 
Location Obs. % SSA > 25 % SSA ≤ 25 
US 30 96.67 3.33 
  (3.28) (3.28) 
China 36 86.11 13.89 
  (5.76) (5.76) 







Table A.10: Spearman’s Correlation Matrix (US Sessions) 
 1 2 3 
1. Smallest Share Accepted -   
 -   
2. Bid 0.240* -  
 (0.073)* -  
3. Overbid 0.306** 0.867*** - 
 (0.030)** (0.000)*** - 
Notes: The p-values for each coefficient are reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance (p-value < 




Table A.11: Spearman’s Correlation Matrix (China Sessions) 
 1 2 3 
1. Smallest Share Accepted -   
 -   
2. Bid 0.078 -  
 (0.554) -  
3. Overbid 0.118 0.860 - 
 (0.364) (0.000) - 
Notes: The p-values for each coefficient are reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance (p-value < 







Table A.12: Spearman’s Correlation Matrix (Pooled) 
 1 2 3 
1. Smallest Share Accepted -   
 -   
2. Bid 0.148 -  
    
 (0.114) -  
3. Overbid 0.185** 0.860 - 
 (0.046) (0.000) - 
Notes: The p-values for each coefficient are reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance (p-value < 
















Table A.13: Interval Regressions on MAS 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Bid 0.09* 0.07   
 (0.05) (0.05)   
Overbid   7.05*** 6.86*** 
   (2.51) (2.38) 
Weakly Competitive  7.89**  8.39** 
  (3.03)  (2.95) 
Risk Averse  -6.77**  -6.96** 
  (2.88)  (2.76) 
Male  2.12  1.98 
  (2.59)  (2.49) 
China  -0.53  -0.55 
  (2.61)  (2.55) 
Constant 31.31*** 34.45*** 30.83*** 33.36*** 
 (2.18) (3.95) (1.88) (3.53) 
Natural log of the Standard Error Function (σ) 
China 0.4*** 0.38** 0.42*** 0.42*** 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Constant 2.43*** 2.4*** 2.39*** 2.34*** 
 (0.1) (0.11) (0.1) (0.1) 
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APPENDIX B: ADDITIONAL TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
 
Table B.1: Prize Divisions 
Share 1 90 85 80 75 70 65 60 55 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 
Share 2 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 




















1 56 56 (50%, 50 %) 1.8 1.7 
2 72 48 (50%, 50 %) 14.3 20.0 
3 88 40 (50%, 50 %) 30.4 28.3 
4 104 32 (50%, 50 %) 28.6 23.3 
5 120 24 (50%, 50 %) 16.1 16.7 
6 140 4 (50%, 50 %) 8.9 10.0 
Notes: Subjects were instructed to choose 1 of the 6 lotteries listed above. The degree of constant relative risk 
aversion (CRRA) associated with each lottery is as follows: [Lottery 1 | 3.46 < r], [Lottery 2 | 1.16 < r  < 3.46], 
[Lottery 3 | 0.71 < r < 0.16], Lottery 4 | 0.50 < r , 0.71], Lottery 5 | 0 < r < 0.50], [Lottery 6 | r < 0].  Variable 















(% Option B) 
China 
(% Option B) 
1 (48, 48) (48, 24) 16.1 35.0 
2 (48, 48) (48, 32) 23.2 40.0 
3 (48, 48) (48, 40) 23.2 53.3 
4 (48, 48) (48, 56) 64.3 40.0 
5 (48, 48) (48, 64) 60.7 28.3 
6 (48, 48) (48, 72) 58.9 25.0 
Notes:  Subjects were instructed to state whether you prefer Option A or Option B for each row. Variable 
‘Competitive’ = 1 if the subjects chose Option B for Decisions 1-3 and Option A for Decisions 4-6.  Variable 































APPENDIX C: POWER ANALYSIS 
Mean Bids Across Locations 
     Using results from Sheremeta (2013)’s survey, we estimate that average bids in a contest with 
2 symmetric players and a $5 prize to be approximately 38 ECU (or 52% greater than the Nash 
prediction). While standard deviations are not reported in this survey, from studies similar to our 
own we find that the standard deviation of bids in a symmetric 2-player rent seeking contest is 
approximately equal to the Nash predicted bid (Kimbrough and Sheremeta, 2013; Herman and 
Orzen 2008; Fonseca, 2009; Chowdhury and Sheremeta, 2014). Finally, we take the size of our 
samples from the US (NU = 56) and China (Nc = 60) as given. 
     Assuming a US sample mean bid of 𝑥𝑥𝑈𝑈 = 38 and a common sample standard deviation of 
𝜎𝜎� = 25, we find that the minimum detectable difference in mean bids across locations with 80% 
power is approximately 13 ECU. This difference is rather large, considering that it could imply 
either a mean bid consistent with the Nash prediction in China or total rent dissipation. 
Additionally, to detect a difference of 10 ECU with 80% power we would need a total sample 
size of approximately 200. Thus, we relegate differences in bids across locations to a lower 
status in our analysis.  
Acceptance Rates Across Locations 
     Unlike bids in rent seeking contest, we do not have a clear reference point from prior studies 
with which to base our assumed acceptance rate for the control group. However, we can use the 
predicted acceptance rate of 50% from standard theory to estimate the minimum detectable 
difference in acceptance rates for a share of 25 ECU.  
     Given the size of our samples from the US (NU = 56) and China (Nc = 60) and assuming an 
acceptance rate in the US consistent with standard theory 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑈𝑈 = 50%, the minimum detectable 
difference with 80% power is approximately 26.5%.1  Additionally, to detect a difference of 20% 
with 80% power we would need a total sample size of approximately 212. Thus, we relegate 
differences in acceptance rates across locations to a lower status in our analysis. 
                                                          
1 This is the minimum detectable difference if one uses a two-sample Fisher’s exact test of proportions.  
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CHAPTER II:  
HOW DID WE GET HERE? THE EFFECTS OF EARNED INCOME AND 





     In this paper, we examine the influence of earned entitlement on preferences for redistribution 
by implementing the redistribution game from Kuziemko et al. (2014) in settings where the 
initial distribution of payouts is determined by either (1) a random lottery, or (2) performance in 
a competitive task. Using responses from our post experiment questionnaire, we also find that 
this behavior is strongly correlated conservative opinions regarding the Federal Minimum Wage 
and Conscientiousness (as measured by the BFI-44) in both competitive and random rank 
settings. Our results shed some light on factors that influence preferences for redistribution, and 
how earned entitlement may affect trade-offs between equity and ordinal rank. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
     In recent years, preferences for income redistribution have received much attention from 
experimental economists (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Charness & Rabin, 
2002; Engelmann & Strobel , 2004; 2007). A common theme found in this literature is that 
individuals typically exhibit preferences consistent with the prioritarian view (Parfit, 1997), 
choosing to help those worse off than themselves or worse off than others whom they have an 
opportunity to help. 
     A clear example of such behavior can be found in Kuziemko et al., (2014), who conducted a 
modified dictator game (referred to as, “the redistribution game”) in which subjects are randomly 
assigned rank ordered payoffs and then tasked with distributing a bonus payment to one of the 
two players nearest to themselves in the earnings distribution. The authors find that subjects 
overwhelmingly chose to help the player with a smaller initial payoff, even when doing so 
reduced the choosing player’s ordinal rank in pay. However, it remains an open question whether 
this result persists if the earnings distribution is determined by a competitive process based on 
effort or skill as opposed to pure chance.  
     In this paper, we report results from a laboratory experiment in which subjects take part in the 
Redistribution Game from Kuziemko et al. (2014) under a variety of conditions. Using a within-
subjects design, we vary the process that determines the initial payoff distribution across 
competitive and non-competitive (or random-rank) settings. Our goal is to test whether the 
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presence of competition will diminish subjects’ willingness to sacrifice their rank in pay to 
reduce inequality.  
     This study builds upon a large and growing literature focused on the various underlying 
processes determining income distributions and how they impact preferences regarding changes 
in the distribution. Currently, there is abundant evidence from field data that supports this 
hypothesis. For instance, a number of studies analyze survey data, finding a populations’ desired 
level of progressive taxation/redistribution is strongly correlated with the degree in which the 
population believes the initial distribution to be determined by luck as opposed to effort or merit 
(Alesina & Angeletos, 2005; Alesina & Giuliano, 2011; Alesina, Cozzi & Mantovan, 2012; 
Clark & D'Ambrosio, 2015). Meanwhile, preferences for redistribution when outcomes are 
determined by innate ability tend to fall somewhere in between those of effort and luck 
(Leventhal & Michaels, 1971; Rest et al., 1973; Isaksson & Lindskog, 2009).  
     Existing theories in this field relate notions of fairness to agents’ social preferences for 
redistribution (Roemer, 1998; Konow 2000). For example, the accountability principle, as 
defined by Konow (2000), states that perceptions of fairness with respect to the income 
distribution vary in proportion to the degree in which discretionary variables, at the individual 
level, determine outcomes. In this utility framework, effort is viewed as being discretionary 
while innate ability is viewed as nondiscretionary. Konow (2000) reports results from a set of 
laboratory experiments in which unequal endowments as well as player roles were determined by 
subjects’ performance in a series of tasks. While reported results support their predictions 
regarding the influence of earned entitlement on social preferences, their predicted difference 
between the effect of effort and innate ability was not confirmed. Similar results are also found 
in Oxoby and Spraggon (2008) as well as Iida (2015), in that subject behavior is similar across 
distribution determined by real-effort and innate ability.  
     Other experimental inquiries into the influence of earned entitlement do so using two-player 
bargaining games (Cherry et al 2002; Hoffman and Spitzer, 1985; Hoffman et al., 1994; Ruffle 
1998). A considerable difference in the present study is that subjects in our experiment make 
decisions affecting the earnings distribution within a larger reference group which allows us to 
examine symmetric behavior at various points along the earnings distribution. 
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     Experiments with larger reference groups find that earned entitlement decreases concerns for 
inequality using public choice mechanisms (Durante, Putterman & Van der Weele, 2014; 
Krawczyk, 2010), augmented dictator games (Barr, Burns, Miller & Shaw, 2015; Erkal, 
Gangadharan & Nikiforakis, 2011; Riyanto & Zhang 2013), and an augmented moon lighting 
game (Fehr, 2018). However, all the experiments thus far mentioned provide subjects with a 
choice set in which one’s own earnings, total earnings for the reference group, and one’s share of 
total group earnings vary across the available alternatives. In the redistribution game, each of 
these cardinal measures are invariant to the subject’s choice. This allows us to isolate changes in 
ordinal rank, equity, and priority. Nevertheless, if earned entitlement diminishes the importance 
of inequality in subjects’ preference evaluations, this could have a negative effect on their 
likelihood of choosing a lower ranked player in our competitive settings. 
     Another strand of literature related to our experiment examines how the presence of 
competition can trigger envy or spite among those who perform poorly towards those who were 
more successful. For example, Chowdhury & Gürtler (2015) shows that poor contest performers 
are those most likely to engage in sabotage, while top performers are those most targeted. 
Additionally, Jauernig et al. (2016) allows subjects to punish each other after outcomes are 
determined, finding substantial money burning and spiteful behavior in the absence of strategic 
concerns. Like the studies mentioned previously, subjects’ decisions in Jauernig et al. (2016) and 
the experiments surveyed in Chowdhury & Gürtler (2015) influence own earnings, total group 
earnings for the reference group, and one’s share of group earnings which differs significantly 
from our decision setting. However, if competitive situations trigger envy or spite, the presence 
of competition may further repel subjects from rewarding a player that outperformed themselves. 
     In our analysis, we find that subjects choose the lower ranked player approximately 70% of 
the time. We also find that this tendency decreases in the presence of competition, and that this 
difference is significant among ranks in which subjects must sacrifice their ordinal position in the 
earnings distribution to help the lower ranked player. These results provide further support for 
the priority view of income redistribution, though this preference is slightly diminished when 
one’s position in the payoff distribution is earned. 
43 
 
     In our post experiment questionnaire, we elicit information regarding subjects’ political 
affiliations and opinions regarding specific public policies to see how these characteristics relate 
to behavior in our decision setting. When we include these responses into our analysis, we find 
subjects with conservative opinions regarding the minimum wage to be significantly less likely 
to choose the lower ranked player than others with more progressive views. This difference is 
robust to a battery of regressions that include controls for political party affiliation and gender. 
     These results are similar to those in previous experiments, finding political preferences to 
coincide with ‘behavioral types’ (Durante et al., 2014). We also argue that this result is of 
particular importance given that increasing the Federal Minimum Wage (a commonly considered 
public policy proposal in the United States to address growing income inequality) is an 
egalitarian public policy with salient negative effects on the ordinal position of those near the 
bottom of the income distribution. Our results provide additional support for the claim that 
opposition to an increase in the Federal Minimum Wage is driven, at least in part, by an aversion 
to these adverse effects that are often ignored by researchers in other disciplines (Kuziemko et 
al., 2014). 
     The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a detailed description 
of the redistribution game. Section 3 explains the design of our experiment, summarizes salient 
behavioral predictions from models of inequality aversion and lists our main hypotheses of 
interest. Section 4 reports the main results from our experiment testing the hypotheses listed in 
Section 3. In Section 5, we use responses from our post experiment questionnaire to examine 
individual specific heterogeneity in behavior and relate it to the relevant literature. Section 6 
concludes. 
2. THE REDISTRIBUTION GAME 
     The standard version of the redistribution game begins with subjects (sorted into groups of 6) 
being randomly assigned rank ordered payouts to establish an initial distribution of payoffs. The 
player ranked 1st receives $6, the player ranked 2nd receives $5, and payoffs continue to decline 
in $1 increments over ranks with the player ranked 6th (last) receives $1. Once the initial 
distribution of payoffs is determined, ranks and initial payoffs of each player for the current 
round are common knowledge.  
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     Then each player must then give one of the two players closest to themselves in the earnings 
distribution a $2 bonus payment provided by the experimenter. This means that the player ranked 
first must choose between giving $2 to either the 2nd or 3rd ranked player, the player ranked last 
must choose between giving $2 to either the 4th or 5th ranked player, and each player ranked 2nd 
through 5th must choose between giving the player ranked directly above or below them an 
additional $2. 1 
     No matter their rank in the initial earnings distribution, choosing the player ranked directly 
below oneself will always result in greater payoff inequality for the group. Given that rank 
ordered payoffs are separated by $1 increments, choosing the player directly below oneself also 
results in a drop-in rank for the choosing player. Thus, players ranked 2nd-5th face a trade-off 
between reducing inequality and preserving their initial rank in the payoff distribution. 
     After players make their decisions, one player is randomly chosen and his choice determines 
the final payoffs of that round. As such, players should make their decisions as if they alone will 
determine the final distribution of the round. To avoid any reciprocity effects, players do not 
know which player is chosen or the final outcome of the round when making their allocation 
choice. After the end of each round, players are randomly sorted into new groups of six, players 
within each group are rerandomized across the same rank ordered payoff distribution and the 
game repeats. Earnings from the game are determined by their final balances for one randomly 
chosen round.  
3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND HYPOTHESES 
     Using a within-subjects design, we implement the redistribution game under three conditions 
in each session using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The first condition is identical to the standard 
version of the redistribution game with rank ordered payouts being randomly assigned. In the 
remaining two conditions, ranks are determined in competitive settings based on performance in 
either a real-effort task with slider- bars (Gill & Prowse, 2012) or a mental rotation task 
(Vandenberg & Kuse, 1978).  
                                                          
1 Choice sets for each rank are summarized in Table D.1. 
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     Apart from the mechanism determining the initial distribution of payouts, the redistribution 
game is played identically across conditions. Each session had of three stages of play (one for 
each condition),2 and stages consisted of 8 (or 9) rounds with the last 7 being eligible to impact 
earnings. In the text that follows, we describe each of the competitive tasks and experiment 
procedures in greater detail before deriving our main hypotheses of interest.  
3.1 Effort Task  
     To examine the influence of competition in which effort plays a primary role in determining 
outcomes, we use a computerized real effort task with slider-bars, first seen in Gill and Prowse 
(2012). Subjects are presented with a screen consisting of 48 slider bars. Figure D.1 provides an 
example of a slider-bar and screenshots of the interactive screen players used to complete the 
task.  
     The position of the slider is associated with a number between 0 and 100, inclusive. For each 
slider placed in the center of its respective bar, subjects receive 1 point. In each round of play, 
subjects were given 60 seconds to score as many points as they could with a timer provided in 
the top right corner of their screen. When the timer reached zero, the program progressed 
automatically to the redistribution game. Rank ordered payouts were determined by subject 
scores, from highest to lowest. Once each subject submitted their allocation decision, subjects 
were randomly sorted into new 6 player groups and the game repeats.  
3.2 Ability Task 
     To examine the influence of competition in which innate ability plays a primary role in 
determining outcomes, we use a computerized mental rotation task originally designed by 
Vandenberg and Kuse (1978). The task is commonly used to measure spatial intelligence which 
is strongly correlated with general intelligence. presents subjects with images of three- 
dimensional. An example of the mental rotation problems that subjects were asked to complete 
can be seen in the Figure D.2. 
                                                          
2 The order in which random-rank, effort and ability task conditions were implemented was randomized across 
sessions. A summary of treatments can be found in Table D.2. 
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     As you can see, on the left-hand side of the screen subjects are provided with one image of a 
“reference object” and four other images on the right-hand side of the screen which we call their 
“Choice Set”. In each choice set, two of the images provided are reflections or enantiomorphs of 
the reference object and the two that remain are identical to the reference object but rotated to 
some degree. To score, subject must correctly identify at least one of the images in the choice set 
that are identical to the reference object. Subjects may either find one of the two identical objects 
and score 1 point, or find both and score 2 points. However, to minimize the scope for 
randomness, if a player identifies an object in the choice set as an identical to the reference 
object, and this is not the case, they receive 0 points for their response. 
     In each round of play, subjects had 6 image sets and 90 seconds to complete them. Subjects 
were allowed to skip back and forth through their 6-image set, as they would be able to in a 
paper version of the same task. Subjects were provided with a 90 second timer in the top right 
corner of their screen, and when the timer reached zero, the program automatically progressed to 
the redistribution game. Rank ordered payouts were determined by subject scores, from highest 
to lowest, and a subject’s own score was provided on their decision screen for the redistribution 
game. Once each subject submitted their allocation decision, subjects were randomly sorted into 
new 6 player groups and the game repeats.  
3.3 Procedures 
     All sessions of the experiment were conducted at the Economics Experimental Laboratory at 
the University of Tennessee during the summer and fall semesters of 2015. Each session took 
approximately 70 minutes to complete. Subjects were recruited from large lecture halls during 
introductory undergraduate courses at the University of Tennessee. All subjects in the pool have 
voluntarily registered to participate in economics experiments via the online registration site 
(https://utk-econlab.sona-systems.com). Sessions were conducted with at most 24 and as few as 
12 participants. Our data set contains 5,412 observations from 222 participants. Slightly more 
than 40% of our subjects were female. 
     Earnings from each session were determined by randomly selecting one round in each stage 
to be played out for payment. Participants were not informed of the round chosen from any of the 
three stages until the experiment was complete. With the addition of a $5 show up fee, 
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participants earned an average of $16.50 in each session. Across all sessions, participants earned 
as little as $8.00 and as much as $27.00.  
     At the beginning of each session, we informed participants of our lab’s basic protocols. Then, 
we read aloud the instructions consistent across rounds and stages. Participants knew that they 
could leave the experiment at any time if they so wished, though none left before the conclusion 
of their session. Each stage of the experiment was preceded by a public reading of the 
instructions specific to the stage. Participants were not informed of the number of stages, nor the 
types of tasks they would be asked to complete in subsequent stages. 
3.4 Predictions from Models of Inequality Aversion 
     Before we discuss our main hypothesis of interest, it is important to note that accepted models 
of inequality aversion either make no clear prediction or suggest that people prefer to give to the 
lower-ranked player. For instance, the model of inequality aversion proposed by Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999) posits that utility for an individual with a payoff 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 in a distribution of 𝑥𝑥1, 𝑥𝑥2, … 
𝑥𝑥𝑁𝑁 can be written as 
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖, 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗≠𝑖𝑖� = 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 −
𝛼𝛼
𝑛𝑛−1
∑ Max�𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 , 0�𝑛𝑛−1𝑗𝑗≠𝑖𝑖 −
𝛽𝛽
𝑛𝑛−1
∑ Max�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 − 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 , 0�𝑛𝑛−1𝑗𝑗≠𝑖𝑖   
where the parameter 𝛼𝛼 > 0 measures the marginal disutility associated with disadvantageous 
inequality, while the parameter 𝛽𝛽 ≥ 0 measures the marginal disutility associated with 
advantageous inequality such that 𝛼𝛼 ≥ 𝛽𝛽.  
     In this utility framework, players ranked 2nd-5th face a symmetric choice in utility terms. 
Choosing the higher ranked player will increase disadvantageous inequality by two units, while 
choosing the lower ranked player will (i) increase disadvantageous by one unit and (ii) reduce 
advantageous inequality by one unit. Given that the model assumes that players (weakly) dislike 
both types of inequality, it predicts that players ranked 2nd-5th will choose the lower ranked 
player in their choice set.   
     A similar argument can be made for players ranked 1st who must choose between players 
ranked 2nd and 3rd. Choosing the player ranked 2nd will decrease advantageous inequality by one 
unit and increase disadvantageous inequality by one unit. Since choosing the player ranked 3rd 
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only results in a reduction in advantageous inequality (by 2 units), this model predicts that 
players ranked 1st will choose the lower ranked player in their choice set as well. The only rank 
for which this model does not make a prediction is 6th place, because either option would simply 
increase disadvantageous inequality by two units.  
     Another inequality aversion, proposed by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), posits that utility for 
an individual with payoff 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 in a distribution of 𝑥𝑥1, 𝑥𝑥2, … 𝑥𝑥𝑁𝑁 can be written as 






The parameter 𝛾𝛾 ≥ 0 is a weight that measures a player’s concern for inequality, and inequality 
is measured as the absolute value of the difference between player i’s payoff if the distribution 
were equal and player i’s payoff share of total payoffs for the group. Since decisions in the 
redistribution game have no influence on the choosing player’s share of group earnings,  this 
model predicts that each player is equally likely to choose the lower ranked player in their choice 
set. 
   Kuziemko et al. (2014) found that behavior in the redistribution game was largely consistent 
with predictions from Fehr and Schmidt (1999), with subjects choosing the lower ranked player 
more than 70% of the time. However, the did observe heterogeneity in behavior across ranks 
which cannot be explained by either theory. For instance, players facing a rank-equity trade-off 
(i.e. those ranked 2nd-5th) chose the lower ranked player less often than those who did not face 
such a trade-off (i.e. those ranked 1st and 6th).3 Our experiment is designed to examine how 
earned entitlement might influence these trade-offs and thus, our main hypothesis of interest 
addresses the decisions made by players ranked 2nd-5th. 
3.5 Hypotheses 
     Given the design and the discussion above, we construct two sets of hypotheses regarding the 
influence of competition on behavior in the redistribution game. The first set considers the 
difference in behavior during the redistribution game across random-rank and competitive 
                                                          
3 While Fehr-and Schmidt (1999) makes no predictions for players in 6th place, Kuziemko et al., (2014) explain their 
tendency to choose the lower ranked player as a preference for helping subjects with less money than others. 
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settings for subjects that face a trade-off between equity and rank (i.e. those ranked 2nd-5th). The 
second set considers the behavior of subjects who do not face a rank-equity trade-off. (i.e. those 
ranked 1st or 6th).  
     From the literature on earned entitlement, we find that subjects are often more self-regarding 
and less concerned with inequality when payoffs are earned. Thus, if subject feel that they have 
earned their position in the earnings distribution they may be more reluctant to sacrifice their 
rank for the sake of reducing inequality for the group, which would suggest a decrease in the 
likelihood of choosing the lower ranked player. On the other hand, subjects may be envious or 
spiteful toward subjects that outperform them and refrain giving them additional earnings. This 
suggests that competition may increase the likelihood of players ranked 2nd-5th choosing the 
player ranked below them. We summarize these predictions below in Hypotheses 1.A and 1.B.  
Hypothesis 1.A. (Earned Entitlement) Subjects ranked 2nd-5th are less likely to provide the 
bonus payment to the lower ranked player in competitive settings than they are when rank is 
randomly determined.  
Hypothesis 1.B. (Competition induces spite/envy) Subjects ranked 2nd-5th are more likely to 
provide the bonus payment to the lower ranked player in competitive settings than they are when 
rank is randomly determined.  
     When considering the behavior in the outer ranks (1st and 6th place), it’s important to note 
that subjects choose between the two players ranked nearest to themselves in the earnings 
distribution. For those in 1st place, this means selecting either the player in 2nd place or 3rd the 
player in 3rd. Selecting the lower ranked player (in this case) reduces inequality and preserves 
one’s rank. And, since the player ranked 1st was not outperformed by either player in their 
choice set, we do not have reason to believe that 1st place behavior will differ significantly 
across treatments. Similarly, those in 6th place was outperformed by both players in their choice 
set (players ranked 4th and 5th), and their redistribution decision can have no effect on their final 
rank in pay. Thus, we do not have reason to believe that 6th place behavior will differ 




Hypothesis 2. The behavior of subjects ranked 1st or 6th will not differ across random-rank and 
competitive settings.  
4. RESULTS 
     We begin our analysis by examining subjects’ tendency to choose the lower ranked player in 
the redistribution game. To do this, we generate the indicator variable 𝑦𝑦 which is set equal to 1 if 
the lower ranked player was chosen and calculate subject specific means condition on our 
random rank condition (RR), the slider-bar task (ET), the mental rotation task (AT), and 
competitive settings more generally (CT) by pooling observation in ET and AT. In Section 4.1 
we test our main hypotheses of interest by examining behavior in RR and CT. Then, in Section 
4.2, we take a closer look at our competitive settings by examining behavior in ET and AT 
individually.  
4.1 Random Rank and Competitive Settings 
     Table D.3 reports sample means of y conditional on our random rank (RR) and competitive 
(CT) settings. It shows that subjects selected the lower ranked player approximately 72.7% of the 
time in RR and approximately 68.4% of the time in CT. A cumulative distribution function for 
individual specific means in RR and CT, respectively, is provided in Figure D.3.  
     Now we turn our attention to Hypotheses 1 and 2. Because they refer specifically to the 
redistribution decisions of subjects facing rank-equity trade-offs (i.e. those ranked 2nd-5th) and 
those who do not (i.e. those ranked 1st and 6th), respectively, we conduct our first tests of these 
hypotheses using regression analysis. Table D.4 reports regression results with y as the 
dependent variable, standard errors clustered by subjects, and a dummy variable for CT to 
capture our treatment effect of interest. 
     Our first two model specifications in Table D.4 report results from linear regressions using 
observations from all three stages of each session. Specification 1 controls for decisions in the 
outer ranks by including fixed effects for first and last place, and our estimated coefficient 
associated with CT is both negative and statistically significant (p-value = 0.049). Specification 2 
builds upon Specification 1 by including interaction terms “First*CT” and “Sixth*CT” to control 
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for differences in y across settings in the outer ranks. Here we find that neither of the estimates 
associated with our interaction terms are statistically significant (both p-values >0.210). 
However, we the estimated coefficient associated with CT remains negative, increases in 
magnitude, and remains statistically significant at the 5% level (p-value = 0.027).  
     Specifications 3 and 4 estimate our treatment effect of interest using panel regressions with 
subject specific fixed effects to control order effects and other forms of individual specific 
heterogeneity. Similar to Specification 1, when controlling for decisions in the outer ranks with 
dummy variables we estimate a negative a significant effect of CT on choosing the player below 
oneself in the payoff distribution (p-value = 0.049). Specification 4 includes interaction terms to 
control for differences in y across settings in the outer ranks, and we also fail to detect a 
significant difference in our dependent variable across treatment conditions in either of the outer 
ranks (both p-values > 0.210). We do, however, estimate a negative and significant effect 
associated with CT (p-value = 0.031). We summarize these results below in Findings 1 and 2.  
Finding 1: Subjects ranked 2nd-5th are jointly more likely to choose the player ranked below 
them (rather than the player ranked above) in the random-rank setting than they are in 
competitive settings.  
Finding 2: We fail to detect a significant difference in redistribution decisions across treatment 
conditions in either of the outer ranks (1st or 6th). 
     Next, we estimate rank specific means of y in RR and CT respectively to examine whether the 
influence of competition is consistent across ranks for players facing a rank-equity trade-off. 
Figure D.4 plots rank specific means derived from linear regressions. Here we can see that 
subjects chose the lower ranked player at a higher rate in RR than CT across ranks 2nd-5th, and 
this difference is statistically significant for ranks 3rd (p-value = 0.007) and 4th (p-value = 
0.081).  
     Figure D.5 plots rank specific mean from fixed effect panel regressions. Again, we find that 
means of y in RR associated ranks 2nd-5th respectively, are greater than those in CT. The only 
rank specific difference in means that reaches statistical significance is that associated with 3rd 
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place (p-value = 0.006), although joint difference between 4th and 5th place across RR and CT is 
significant at the 10% level (p-value =0.083). We summarize these results below in Finding 3.  
Finding 3: Subjects ranked 3rd are significantly less likely to choose the lower ranked player 
ranked in CT than in RR. 
     Findings 1 and 3 contradict Hypothesis 1.B and are consistent with Hypothesis 1.A. The 
provide some support for the claim that subjects are more concerned with preserving their rank 
in pay when their position along the payoff distribution is earned. Finding 2 is consistent with 
Hypothesis 2 and suggests that earned entitlement does not have a significant influence on the 
trade-offs facing players rank first or last in the redistribution game. In the following subsection, 
we examine behavior in ET and AT individually to see whether our findings across tasks.  
4.2 Ability and Effort Tasks 
     Table D.5 in reports sample means of y conditional on AT and ET. Here we find that subjects 
chose the lower ranked player in their choice set 68% of the time in AT. Meanwhile, in ET, 
subjects chose the lower ranked player 68.7% of the time.  
     To compare the decisions in RR with those in AT and ET respectively, we report regression 
results in Table D.6. Each model specification includes y as the dependent variable with fixed 
effect for decisions made in the outer ranks, and clustered standard errors (by subject). This 
allows us to capture our treatment effects of interest with dummy variables for AT and ET. 
capture our treatment effects of interest.  
     Our first two model specifications report results from linear regressions. Specification 1 finds 
a negative effect for both competitive settings. While the estimated coefficient associated with 
AT is significant at the 5% level (p-value = 0.047), the estimated coefficient associated with ET 
is negative but marginally insignificant (p-value = 0.103). Specification 2 builds upon 
Specification 1 by including interaction terms between our outer rank dummy variables with ET 
and AT, respectively. Compared to RR, we find subjects ranked 2nd-5th were 6.9% less likely to 
choose the player below in AT and 4.2% less likely to do so in ET. However, while the estimated 
coefficient with AT is highly significant (p-value = 0.007), the estimate associated with ET does 
is not significant (p-value = 0.130).  
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     To control order effects and other forms of individual specific heterogeneity, Specifications 3 
and 4 estimate our treatment effects of interest using panel regressions with subject specific fixed 
effects. Specification 3 detects a significant decrease in the likelihood that subjects ranked 2nd-5th 
choose the player below in AT relative to RR (p-value = 0.049), and a negative but insignificant 
effect associated with ET (p-value = 0.105). In Specification 4, we include interaction terms 
between outer rank dummy variables with AT and ET and find similar results. Our estimated 
coefficient associated with AT is negative and significant (p-value = 0.015), while the estimated 
coefficient associated with ET is negative but insignificant (p-value = 0.101). We summarize 
these results below in Finding 4.  
Finding 4: Subjects Ranked 2nd-5th are more likely to choose the player ranked below them in 
the random-rank setting than they are in either competitive setting, though this difference is most 
significant in AT.  
     Next, we estimate rank specific means of y in AT and ET respectively to examine whether the 
influence of competition is consistent across ranks in each task when players facing a rank-equity 
trade-off. Figure D.6 plots rank specific means derived from linear regressions. Here we can see 
that the means of y in AT associated ranks 2nd, 4th and 5th respectively, are less than those than 
those in ET but not significantly so. Compared to RR, the means for third place are significantly 
smaller in both AT (p-value = 0.005) and ET (p-value = 0.018), and the same is true for our 
fourth place mean in AT (p-value = 0.055).  
     Figure D.7 plots rank specific means from fixed effect panel regressions. Here we find that 
means of y in both AT and ET associated with ranks 2nd-5th are less than those in RR. Similar to 
our previous results, we detect a significant difference between our estimated mean for 3rd and 
4th place in AT (p- value = 0.000) and for third place in ET (p-value = 0.021). We summarize 
these results below in Finding 5. 
 
Finding 5: Subjects ranked 3rd are significantly less likely to choose the lower ranked player 




5. ADDITIONAL EXPLORATIONS 
     We continue our analysis by incorporating individual level characteristics in an attempt to 
explain some of the variation in outcomes across subjects. First, we consider the relationship 
between behavior in the redistribution game and mean performance in our competitive tasks. 
Then we use responses to our post experiment questionnaire to examine individual differences in 
preferences regarding the US Federal minimum wage and personality as measured by the Big 
Five Personality index.  
5.1 Mean Performance 
     Table D.7 reports mean scores in our effort and ability tasks along with estimated spearman 
correlation coefficients between subject specific means for y and each score, respectively. Here 
we can see that average performance in the slider-bar task is positively correlated with choosing 
the lower ranked player and that this relationship is significant at the 5% level (p-value = 
0.0295). Average performance in the mental rotation task appears to have a negative relationship 
with choosing the lower ranked player, though we fail to reject the null hypothesis the two 
variables are statistically independent (p-value = 0.4689). 
     Table D.8 reports results from linear regressions similar to the Specification 4 in Table D.6, 
but with additional controls for mean scores in AT and/or ET. Here we find similar treatment 
effect to those reported in Table D.6, which suggests that they are robust to controls for mean 
performance. Specification 1 estimates a negative but insignificant relationship between mean 
performance in the mental rotation task and choosing the lower ranked player (p-value = 0.495), 
while Specification 2 estimates a positive and significant relationship between performance in 
the slider-bar task and choosing the lower ranked player (p-value = 0.046). 
     Specification 3 controls for mean performance for both tasks simultaneously and finds similar 
results, estimating a positive and significant coefficient associated with mean performance in ET 
(p-value = 0.044) and a negative but insignificant coefficient associated with mean performance 
in AT (p-value = 0.367). Our last model specification in Table D.8 augments Specification 2 by 
controlling for the influence of mean slider-bar task performance on y in ET. Specification 4 
shows that the relationship between mean performance in slider-bar task and choosing the lower 
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ranked is still positive but is no longer statistically significant (p-value = 0.116) independent of 
its influence in ET specifically. We summarize these results below, in Finding 6. 
Finding 6: Mean performance in the slider bar task is associated with a higher likelihood of 
choosing the lower ranked player in the redistribution game. However, this relationship is most 
significant for players in 1st place, and is statistically insignificant for ranks 2nd-5th.   
5.2 Minimum Wage  
     Next, we consider the relationship between behavior in the redistribution game and subjects’ 
opinions regarding the US Federal Minimum Wage. Policy proposals to increase the federal 
minimum wage have received considerable attention in recent years as a means reduce income 
inequality by redistributing wealth towards those at or near the bottom of the current income 
distribution. We predict that individuals with more conservative opinions regarding the US 
Federal Minimum wage will also be less likely to choose the lower ranked player in the 
redistribution game.  
     At the end of each session, subjects were asked what they think the US Federal Minimum 
Wage should be. A summary of the potential responses and the distribution of their relative 
frequency in our sample can be found in Table D.9. There you can see that responses associated 
with affirmative opinions are arranged ordinally with the variable MW.4 Figure D.8 plots 
individual specific means of y conditional on MW. Here, we can see an upward trend in the 
likelihood of choosing the lower ranked player as subjects’ preferred minimum wage increases. 
This intuition is confirmed by a spearman’s rank correlation test, which detects a positive 
relationship between the two variables that significant at the 1% level (p-value = 0.005).  
     To test whether the effect associated with our minimum wage elicitation is particularly salient 
to subjects facing rank/equity trade-offs, we use regression analysis. Table D.10 reports our 
results derived from linear regressions with clustered standard errors. Each model specification 
includes a fixed effect for CT, fixed effects for the outer ranks, and interaction terms First*CT 
and Sixth*CT. This allows us to estimate the difference in the probability of choosing the player 
                                                          
4 Approximately 6.3% of subjects in our sample did not know what they thought the minimum wage should be. For 
these observations, MW is set equal to a missing value. 
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below when ranked 2nd-5th between subjects with relatively conservative/liberal opinions 
regarding the Federal Minimum Wage.  
     Specification 1 in Table D.10 uses a dummy variable MW[0|1|2] set equal to 1 for subjects 
with relatively conservative opinions regarding the minimum wage.5 Here we find that the 
estimated coefficient associated with MW[0|1|2] is negative and highly significant (p-value = 
0.004). Specification 2 controls for variation across our minimum wage indicator in the outer 
ranks with interaction terms MW[0|1|2]*First and MW[0|1|2]*Sixth, and captures our estimated 
effect of interest with another interaction term between MW[0|1|2] and an indicator variable for 
ranks 2nd-5th. Here we find that subjects with conservative opinions regarding the minimum wage 
are approximately 11.5% less likely than others to choose the player below, and this difference is 
also statistically significant at the 1% level (p-value = 0.008). 
     The remaining model specifications in Table D.10 expand upon Specification 2 by interacting 
our minimum wage indicators specific to ranks First, Middle, and Sixth with dummy variables 
for RR and CT. This allows us to compare the likelihood of choosing the lower ranked player 
across MW[0|1|2] in random rank and competitive settings, respectively. Specification 3 shows 
that subjects with relative conservative opinions regarding the minimum wage are approximately 
11.2% less likely to choose the lower ranked player than others in RT (p-value = 0.019), 11.8% 
less likely to do so in CT (p-value = 0.020), and that both of these differences are statistically 
significant.  
     Specification 4 shows that the effects found in Specification 3 remain negative and significant 
when we control for political affiliation with the Republican and Libertarian parties (p-values < 
0.030), and Specifications 5 and 6 show that the same is true when we control for difference in 
mean performance in our effort and ability tasks (p-values < 0.027). Thus, it appears that subjects 
with relatively conservative opinions regarding the minimum wage are significantly less likely to 
choose the lower ranked player in the redistribution game than others when facing rank-equity 
trade-offs. We summarize these results below in Thus, it appears that the subjects with relatively 
conservative opinions regarding the minimum wage are significantly less likely to choose the 
                                                          
5 Specifically, we set our dummy variable MW[0|1|2] equal to 1 if MW is equal to 0, 1 or 2. Otherwise, variable 
MW[0|1|2] is set equal to 0.  
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lower ranked player in the redistribution game than others when facing rank-equity trade-offs. 
These differences are consistent in both random rank and competitive settings and are robust to 
controls for political party affiliation and mean performance in either competitive task. 
5.3 Personality Traits 
     The relationship between personality and behavior is a seminal topic in social psychology 
(Murray, 1938). Studies examining the relationship between personality traits and economic 
preferences find conscientiousness to be a strong predict of a wide variety of outcomes (for a 
review, see Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman & Kaitz 2011). Because this personality trait is 
positively associated with status striving, competitiveness (Bartling et al., 2009), procedural 
fairness (Colquitt & Scott, 2006) and earned entitlement (Colquitt & Scott et al., 2006), we 
predict that this personality trait will be negatively associated with choosing the lower ranked 
player. 
     At the end of each session, subjects responded 25 items selected from the BFI 44 (Benet-
Martínez & John, 1998). A summary of scores for each personality trait can be found in Table 
D.11, along with estimated Spearman’s correlation coefficients between individual specific 
means of y with each measure, respectively. Of the five personality traits we elicit, only 
conscientiousness has a statistically significant relationship with our dependent variable (p-value 
= 0.0916). As predicted, the estimated coefficient is negative and an illustration of this 
relationship can be seen in Figure D.9. 
To test whether the effect associated with conscientiousness is particularly salient to 
subjects facing rank/equity trade-offs, we use regression analysis. Table D.12 reports our results 
derived from linear regressions with clustered standard errors. Each model specification includes 
a fixed effect for CT, fixed effects for the outer ranks, and interaction terms First*CT and 
Sixth*CT. This allows us to estimate a linear effect of Conscientiousness on the probability of 
choosing the player below when ranked 2nd-5th. 
     Specification 1 in Table D.12 uses subject specific scores for Conscientiousness as our 
dependent variable of interest, and finds that the estimated coefficient associated with it is 
negative and significant at the 5% level (p-value = 0.020). Specification 2 controls for variation 
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across conscientiousness scores in the outer ranks with interaction terms Conscientiousness*First 
and Conscientiousness *Sixth, and captures our estimated effect of interest with another 
interaction term between Conscientiousness and an indicator variable for ranks 2nd-5th. Here we 
find that the positive and significant effect associated with Conscientiousness is both negative 
and significant for subjects facing rank-equity trade-offs (p-value = 0.015). 
     The remaining model specifications in Table D.12 expand upon Specification 2 by interacting 
our Conscientiousness scores specific to ranks First, Middle, and Sixth with dummy variables for 
RR and CT. This allows us to estimates the effect of Conscientiousness on the likelihood of 
choosing the lower ranked player in random rank and competitive settings, respectively. 
Specification 3 estimates a positive and significant effect of Conscientiousness one the likelihood 
of choosing the lower ranked player when placed in the middle ranks in both RT (p-value = 
0.054) and CT (p-value = 0.034). Meanwhile, Specifications 4 and 5 show that the same is true 
when we control for difference in mean performance in our effort and ability tasks (p-values < 
0.039). These results suggest that Conscientiousness has a negative and significant relationship 
with choosing the lower ranked player when it reduces one’s rank in the final earnings 
distribution. 
6. CONCLUSION 
     This paper examines whether earned entitlement has an influence on preferences over equity 
and ordinal position in the earnings distribution by examining behavior in the redistribution 
game (Kuziemko et al., (2014)) under both random rank competitive conditions to investigate. 
Our results show that subjects facing a trade-off between equity and rank were less likely to 
choose the lower ranked player in a competitive setting, and this effect is largely consistent 
across environments where earnings are determined by real-effort or ability. These findings 
support the claim that subjects would become more concerned with preserving their ordinal rank 
in the pay than reducing inequality when payoffs were earned, and they provide further evidence 
for experimental settings that distributions determined by effort or innate ability engender a 
sense of earned entitlement (Hoffman, 1985; Oxoby & Spraggon, 2008; Iida, 2015).  
     When we examine the rank specific effects of competition on behavior in the redistribution 
game, we find that the negative effect on choosing the lower ranked player is particularly strong 
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for players placed 3rd in the initial earnings distribution. In this case, a $2 increase in pay for the 
lower ranked (i.e. the player ranked 4th) would cause would cause the choosing player to fall 
below the median of the earnings distribution. Thus, our findings suggest that this reduction in 
ordinal position may be particularly salient when the payoff distribution is determined by effort 
and ability rather than chance.  
     Additional results of interest are derived using responses from our post experiment 
questionnaire subjects’ personality traits and opinions regarding the Federal Minimum Wage. In 
both random rank and competitive settings, we find that subjects with conservative opinions 
regarding the minimum wage are significantly less likely to choose the lower ranked player when 
doing so could reduce their rank in pay. These findings suggest that individuals that oppose a 
significant increase in the federal minimum wage are relatively more concerned with preserving 
their rank than reducing inequality in the earnings distribution, and they provide some support 
for claims that opposition to an increase in the minimum wage by individuals near the bottom of 
the income distribution may be driven by concerns over a reduction in ordinal position.  
     Regarding personality traits, we detect a significant negative relationship between choosing 
the lower ranked player in the redistribution game and conscientiousness as measured by the 
BFI44 (Benet-Martinez & John, 1998). This relationship is statistically significant for players 
facing rank-equity trade-offs in both random rank and competitive settings, which suggests that 
greater conscientiousness is associated with more concern with maintaining one’s rank in pay 
and less concern with reducing inequality in the earnings distribution. These results contribute to 
a growing literature on the role personality plays in economic decision making, finding 
conscientiousness to be positively correlated with concerns for status (Bartling et al., 2009), 
procedural fairness and earned entitlement (Colquitt & Scott et al., 2006).  
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Appendix D: Tables and Figures 
 
 
Table D.1: Initial payoff distribution and choice set 
Rank Initial Payoff Choice set: Give $2 to… 
1st  $6 2nd or 3rd place player 
2nd  $5 1st or 3rd place player 
3rd  $4 2nd or 4th place player 
4th  $3 3rd or 5th place player 
5th $2 4th or 6th place player 







Table D.2: Treatment Table 
Stage Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 Treatment 4 Treatment 5 Treatment 6 
1 Random Random Effort Effort Ability Ability 
2 Effort Ability Random Ability Random Effort 







Table D.3: Mean of y across random and competitive settings 
Treatment Mean(y) Standard Dev. Min Max 
Random Rank 0.727 0.314 0 1 
Competition 0.684 0.328 0 1 
Notes: This table reports the mean of the proportion of bonus payments given to the lower ranked player for each 










Table D.4: Effect of CT 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Competitive  -0.043** -0.056** -0.043** -0.053** 
 (0.022) (0.025) (0.022) (0.024) 
First 0.098 0.06 0.095 0.093 
 (0.028) (0.038) (0.026) (0.038) 
Sixth 0.084 0.071 0.087 0.051 
 (0.023) (0.03) (0.019) (0.028) 
First*Comp.  0.057  0.003 
  (0.043)  (0.041) 
Sixth*Comp.  0.019  0.057 
  (0.044)  (0.037) 
Constant 0.696 0.705 0.696 0.703 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.016) (0.017) 
OLS     
Fixed Effects     
Notes: Std. Errors are in parentheses, and clustered by subject. The dependent variable in each regression is an 







Table D.5: Means of y Across Competitive Settings 
Task Mean(y) Standard Dev. Min Max 
AT .680 .349 0 1 
ET .687 .362 0 1 
Notes: This table reports the mean of the proportion of bonus payments given to the lower ranked player for each 












Table D.6: Effects of AT and ET  
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
AT -0.046** -0.069*** -0.046** -0.062** 
 (0.023) (0.027) (0.023) (0.025) 
ET -0.039 -0.042 -0.039 -0.043 
 (0.024) (0.028) (0.024) (0.027) 
First 0.098*** 0.06 0.095*** 0.093** 
 (0.028) (0.038) (0.026) (0.038) 
Sixth 0.084*** 0.071** 0.087*** 0.051* 
 (0.023) (0.03) (0.019) (0.028) 
First*AT  0.065  0.023 
  (0.05)  (0.05) 
Sixth*AT  0.069  0.07* 
  (0.044)  (0.042) 
First*ET  0.05  -0.019 
  (0.053)  (0.044) 
Sixth*ET  -0.031  0.042 
  (0.059)  (0.044) 
Constant 0.696*** 0.705*** 0.696*** 0.703*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.016) (0.017) 
OLS     
Fixed Effects     
Notes: Results are derived from linear regressions. Std. Errors are in parentheses and clustered by subject. The 
dependent variable in each regression is an indicator equal to 1 if the lower ranked player was chosen. *p<.10, 







Table D.7: Mean Performance 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Spearman's ρ 
Mean(Ability Score) 222 4.91 1.40 1.57 8.71 -0.037 
Mean(Effort Score) 222 8.54 3.18 0 18.86    0.146** 
Notes: Reports the average score from each competitive task, respectively. In the column titled “Spearman’s ρ”, 
we report estimates testing the null hypothesis that an individual subject’s mean score is independent of their 







Table D.8: Performance Regressions 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
AT -0.069** -0.068** -0.068** -0.068** -0.068** 
 (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) 
ET -0.042 -0.045 -0.044 -0.045 -0.091* 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.052) 
First 0.061 0.06 0.061 0.001 0.06 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.085) (0.038) 
Sixth 0.073** 0.067** 0.069** 0.073** 0.068** 
 (0.03) (0.029) (0.029) (0.069) (0.029) 
First*AT 0.076 0.055 0.07 0.05 0.056 
 (0.052) (0.049) (0.051) (0.049) (0.05) 
Sixth*AT 0.058 0.076* 0.062 0.075* 0.076* 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
First*ET 0.051 0.019 0.019 0.002 0.009 
 (0.053) (0.05) (0.051) (0.05) (0.052) 
Sixth*ET -0.035 0.015 0.011 0.009 0.028 
 (0.059) (0.056) (0.055) (0.056) (0.057) 
Mean(Ability) -0.008  -0.012   
 (0.013)  (0.014)   
Mean(Effort)  0.012* 0.012* 0.011 0.01 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Mean(Effort)*1st    0.007  
    (0.008)  
Mean(Effort)*6th    -0.001  
    (0.007)  
Mean(Effort)*ET     0.005 
     (0.005) 
Constant 0.744 0.605 0.655 0.613 0.616 
 (0.07) (0.061) (0.077) (0.066) (0.061) 
Note: Results are derived from linear regressions. Std. Errors are in parentheses and clustered by subject. The 












Table D.9: Opinions Regarding the US Federal Minimum Wage 
MW Response % of sample 
0 “decrease” 2.7% 
1 “stay the same” 27.5% 
2 “increase to somewhere between $7.26-9.66 per-hour” 26.1% 
3 “increase to somewhere between $9.67-12.08 per-hour” 25.2% 
4 “increase to somewhere between $12.09-14.49 per-hour” 7.2% 
5 “increase to$14.50 or more” 5% 
. “I don’t know” 6.3% 
Notes: During the post experiment questionnaire, subjects were asked their opinion regarding 
changes in the US Federal Minimum wage. The 7 available responses are listed above, along with the percentage 







Table D.10: BFI Scores 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Spearman's ρ (w/ PR) 
Extraversion 12.4 3.71 -0.110 
Agreeableness 14.2 2.94 0.044 
Conscientiousness 13.1 3.18 -0.114* 
Openness 13.8 2.89 -0.050 
Neuroticism 10.2 3.43 0.006 
Notes: During the post experiment questionnaire, subjects responded to 25 of the 43 items in the BFI 44 (John 













Table D.11: Minimum Wage Regressions 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
MW[0|1|2] -0.108*** -0.104*** -0.102** -0.115*** 
 (0.037) (0.038) (0.041) (0.043) 
Republican  -0.011   
  (0.044)   
Libertarian  -0.078   
  (0.079)   
MW{0|1|2]*Comp.   -0.009  
   (0.042)  
MW[0|1|2]*1st    0.043 
    (0.055) 
MW[0|1|2]*6th    0.001 
    (0.046) 
Constant 0.772*** 0.778*** 0.768*** 0.776*** 
 (0.031) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033) 
Notes: Estimates are derived from the linear regression 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1 + 𝛿𝛿0𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿2𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹ℎ𝑖𝑖 +
𝛿𝛿3𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿4𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹ℎ𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖 where 𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘 is our vector of covariates, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if 
player i is taking part in either competitive task, 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if player i is ranked first, 


















Table D.12: Conscientiousness Regressions 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Conscientiousness -0.013** -0.016** -0.012* -0.015** 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
Consc*1st  0.018** 0.017* 0.018** 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Consc*6th  0.002 0.002 0.002 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Consc*Comp.   -0.004  
   (0.008)  
MW[0|1|2]   -0.101*** -0.101*** 
   (0.037) (0.037) 
Constant 0.933*** 0.993*** 0.987*** 1.032*** 
 (0.102) (0.122) (0.124) (0.118) 
Notes: Estimates are derived from the linear regression 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1 + 𝛿𝛿0𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿2𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹ℎ𝑖𝑖 +
𝛿𝛿3𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿4𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹ℎ𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖 where 𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘 is our vector of covariates, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if 
player i is taking part in either competitive task, 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if player i is ranked first, 



































Notes: The figure plots the distribution of individual specific means reported Table 2. 






Notes: Means are derived from the linear regression 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘6𝑘𝑘=1 +  ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖6𝑘𝑘=1 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖, where 
𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 is an indicator for player i having rank k, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  is an indicator variable equal to 1 if player i is taking part in 
either competitive task, standard errors are clustered by subject, and no other controls variables. No constant term is 
included in the regression. Only observations from the first stage of play in each session are included. The y-axis 
values are the OLS coefficients, and standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 




























































Notes: Means are derived from the fixed effect panel regression ?̈?𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝚤𝚤𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘̈6𝑘𝑘=2 +  ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝚤𝚤𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘̈ ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6𝑘𝑘=1 +
𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 where 𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝚤𝚤𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘̈  is an indicator for player i having rank k at time t, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is an indicator variable equal to 1 if player i 
is taking part in either competitive task at time t, standard errors are clustered by subject, and no other controls 
variables are included. The y-axis values are the fixed effects coefficients plus the constant term, and standard errors 
are reported in parenthesis. 



























































Notes: Means are derived from the linear regression 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘6𝑘𝑘=1 +  ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖6𝑘𝑘=1 +
∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 ∗ 𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖6𝑘𝑘=1  where 𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 is an indicator for player i having rank k, 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 is an indicator variable equal to 1 
if player i is taking part in the ability task, 𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  is an indicator variable equal to 1 if player i is taking part in the effort 
task, standard errors are clustered by subject, and no other controls variables. No constant term is included in the 
regression. Only observations from the first stage of play in each session are included. The y-axis values are the 
OLS coefficients, and standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 




Notes: Notes: Means are derived from the fixed effect panel regression ?̈?𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝚤𝚤𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘̈6𝑘𝑘=2 +
 ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝚤𝚤𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘̈ ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6𝑘𝑘=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝚤𝚤𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘̈ ∗ 𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6𝑘𝑘=1 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 where 𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝚤𝚤𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘̈  is an indicator for player i having rank k at time 
t, A𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹t is an indicator variable equal to 1 if player i is taking part in the ability task at time t, E𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹t is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if player i is taking part in the effort task at time t, standard errors are clustered by subject, and no 
other controls variables are included. The y-axis values are the fixed effects coefficients plus the constant term, and 
standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 












Notes: The connected line plots the proportion of bonus payments assigned to the lower ranked player conditional 
on MW. Bars plot the density histogram of MW for the sample. 








Notes: The connected line plots the proportion of bonus payments assigned to the lower ranked player conditional 
on Conscientiousness. Bars plot the density histogram of Conscientiousness for the sample. 





THE EFFECT OF INEQUALITY ON RELATION SPECIFIC 
INVESTMENT AND HOLD-UP: 






    The hold-up problem can arise between a buyer and a seller when contracts are incomplete 
and seller investment is buyer specific.  In such circumstances there can be too little investment 
if sellers expect to be held up. There can also be bargaining failure if sellers who do invest refuse 
to accept “unfair” offers.  Our experiment investigates the role of inequality on the hold-up 
problem by varying the initial endowments of the buyer and sellers. We also investigate the role 
of culture by comparing behavior of Chinese subjects and US subjects. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
     The hold-up problem is a social dilemma that plays a fundamental role in the modern theory 
of the firm.1 It is typically associated with transactions that require non-contractible relation 
specific investment before transacting parties can determine the final distribution of the resulting 
surplus. The problem with such investments is that their specificity renders the gains from trade 
significantly diminished outside the relationship. This prevents buyers and sellers from seeking 
other trading partners if bargaining breaks down after the investment is sunk. Hold-up arises 
when a buyer or seller cannot recoup their ex ante costs in the ex post bargaining stage, which 
discourages investment resulting in deadweight loss.  
     Much of the literature on this topic examines how the hold-up problem between selfish agents 
can be resolved through integration (Klein et al., 1978; Williamson, 1975; 1985; Grossman & 
Hart 1986), under which transacting parties who were previously at arms-length merge into one 
firm or organization with a common objective. However, others have a contrasting view that 
norms regarding fairness and inequality can lead to bargaining behavior that encourages 
investment at the ex-ante stage (Macneil, 1977); Crocker & Masten, 1991), and laboratory 
experiments that consider the role of social preferences in the hold-up problem provide some 
support for these claims (Hackett, 1994). This study builds upon previous experiments by 
varying the initial endowment subjects receive across treatments to examine the influence of 
relative income on relation-specific investment and ex post bargaining behavior in a hold-up 
game in two subject populations with salient differences in national culture. 
                                                 
     1 For a review of this topic, see Hart (1995). 
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     In the standard setup, the hold-up game consists of an irretrievable relation-specific 
investment followed by a bargain over the distribution of resulting surplus. The hold-up game we 
implement begins with a first mover who can use part of their initial endowment to invest in a 
surplus worth nothing to themselves but worth more than their cost of investment to a second 
mover. If the first mover does not invest, the game ends, and each player’s payoff is equal to 
their initial endowment. Should the first mover choose to invest, however, the game progresses 
to an ultimatum bargaining (Güth & Kocher, 2014) over the surplus in which the second mover 
makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the first mover. If the first mover rejects the offer, then there 
is no trade, the surplus disappears, and the first mover does not recover their initial cost of 
investment.  
     Each session of our experiment includes a one-shot hold-up game between two players. Using 
a between-subjects design, we vary the relative endowment each player receives across 
treatments. In each session, subjects submit both first and second mover decisions using the 
strategy method (Selten, 1967) before roles are randomly assigned and strategies are 
implemented to determine earnings. This allows us to observe investment decisions and offers 
from each subject in our sample and compare them across treatments.2  
     With selfish agents, standard backward induction logic predicts that investment will not 
occur, because the first mover anticipates being “held up” by the second mover. However, 
individual behavior is often affected by fairness concerns and social norms that may facilitate 
welfare-enhancing cooperation (Fehr & Schmidt, 2006). For example, subjects in economics 
experiments regularly invest positive amounts in the investment game (Berg et al., 1995) and 
reject non-negative offers in the ultimatum bargaining game, even in anonymous one-shot 
interactions (Güth & Kocher, 2014). Thus, it is not surprising that investment is observed in 
hold-up experiments despite the pessimistic predictions of game theory.  
     A number of previous hold-up experiments have examined the influence of social preferences 
on investment and bargaining behavior. Ellingsen et al., (2004a) implement the hold-up game 
                                                 
     2 To our knowledge, this is the first hold-up experiment implemented with the strategy method. While some 
researchers argue that the process of thinking through the behavioral implications of each decision node lead them to 
process their decisions differently (Roth, 1995), research on ultimatum bargaining and investment games suggest 
that the strategy method does not lead to different experimental results in these settings (Brandts & Charness, 2000, 
2011; Johnson & Mislin, 2011). 
79 
 
described above (under a slightly different parameterization). Using the model of inequality 
aversion proposed by Fehr and Schmidt, (1999), the authors demonstrate that concerns for 
distributional fairness can resolve the hold-up problem and provide accurate predictions 
regarding the investment and bargaining behavior they observe. Additionally, Morita and 
Servatka (2013; 2018) found similar results when implementing the same game and detect a 
significant increase in investment rates when subjects are primed with group identity.   
     Other experiments investigate the influence of social preferences on the hold-up problem 
using different designs. Hackett (1994) implemented a hold-up game with bilateral investment 
and Nash bargaining and found that subjects abide by implicit surplus sharing rules that reflect 
each player’s relative level of investment. Sloof et al. (2007) implemented a modified hold-up 
game in which they remove the first mover’s decision to accept or reject the second mover’s 
offer and vary the observability of investments to test whether behavior can be explained by 
positive reciprocity (Dufwenberg & Kirschsteiger, 2004; Rabin, 1993), but they fail to detect a 
significant difference in behavior across treatments. Dufwenberg et al., (2013) vary the residual 
rights of control across treatments and show that investment decisions are influenced by the first 
mover’s ability to engage in negative reciprocity (Dufwenberg & Kirschsteiger, 2004) by 
withholding the asset if bargaining fails.   
     Here we extend the literature studying the hold-up problem in two ways. First, we vary the 
relative endowments of the first and second movers, deviating from the standard set up in which 
both agents start with the same endowment. Second, we conduct our experiment with both US 
and China subject pools to compare behavior and outcomes across groups with salient 
differences in national culture.   
     By providing symmetric endowments (SE) to players in the hold-up game, previous 
experiments required first movers who chose to invest to enter the bargaining stage behind the 
second mover by the amount of the investment. While we maintain this design as a baseline 
treatment, we also study an asymmetric endowment (AE) treatment in which the first mover and 
second mover enter the bargaining stage with equivalent endowments. Similar to previous 
experiments examining behavior in the trust game (Rodriguez-Lara (2018); Xiao et al., (2018)), 
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asymmetry can help us distinguish offers intended to reimburse the first mover’s cost of 
investment from those motivated by inequality aversion.  
     Consistent with previous experiments, investment and bargaining behavior in the hold-up 
game differ from the predictions of standard theory. Investment rates, offers, and minimum 
willingness to accept (MWTA) are substantially greater than standard theory predicts, though we 
fail to detect a significant difference in investment rates, mean offers, mean MWTA, or 
efficiency in either country. The only significant difference in behavior across endowment 
conditions is that subjects in both the US and China are more likely to choose offers that 
reimburse the first mover’s cost of investment in SE than in AE, which is consistent with 
predictions from inequality aversion (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). However, a substantial portion of 
subjects in both locations behave in ways that contradict inequality aversion but are consistent 
with concerns for reciprocity. 
     We also extend the literature by using distinct subject pools in the US and China. With these 
diverse populations we are able to compare behavior and outcomes across groups with salient 
differences in world culture.  Previous work has compared behavior across Asian and American 
cultures, finding significant differences between them in public goods games Gächter, Herrmann 
& Thöni (2010), trust games (Buchan, Croson & Dawes 2002; Buchan & Johnson et al., 2006), 
and bargaining games (Chuah et al., 2007; 2009; 2014; Deck, Farmer & Zeng, 2009). We elicit 
subjects’ social preferences in order to determine whether there are cultural differences in 
behavior that cannot be captured by these simple social preference classifications.  
     When comparing behavior in our hold-up game across countries, we find that subjects in 
China make significantly larger offers than subjects in the US and reimburse the first mover’s 
cost of investment at a significantly higher rate. Subjects in China also demand significantly 
larger offers to engage in trade and this results in similar efficiency and rates of successful trade 
across countries. These results suggest that subjects in China exhibit a greater concern for 
reimbursing the first mover’s cost of investment than US subjects, which is consistent with 
previous findings in the investment game (Buchan et al., 2002; Buchan & Johnson et al., 2006)). 
     The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our theoretical framework. 
Section 3 presents out experimental design, and Section 4 presents the formal hypotheses we test 
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in our analysis. Sections 5 and 6 reports the main results from our experiment in our US and 
China samples, respectively. In Section 7, we pool the data from our US and China samples to 
compare behavior across endowment conditions and locations. Section 8 concludes with a 
discussion of our results and directions for future research.  
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
     Consider a sequential game between a first and second mover. At stage 1, the first mover can 
make a fixed, non-contractible investment at cost 𝜑𝜑. If the first mover does not invest, the total 
payoffs of both players are equal to their respective endowments 𝜔𝜔1 and 𝜔𝜔2. If the first mover 
invests, then there is a joint surplus 𝛾𝛾 the first and second mover share if they can agree on its 
distribution such that 𝛾𝛾 > 𝜑𝜑. (In most experiments, including ours, the parameters satisfy 𝜑𝜑 > 𝛾𝛾
2
, 
which implies that dividing the gross surplus leaves the first mover worse off than not investing.)  
At stage 2, the second mover makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer 𝜃𝜃 to the first mover which divides 
the surplus 𝛾𝛾. At stage 3, the first mover must either accept or reject the offer.  If the first mover 
accepts the offer 𝜃𝜃, the total payoff for the first mover is 𝜔𝜔1 + 𝜃𝜃–  𝜑𝜑 and the total payoff for the 
second mover is  𝜔𝜔2 + 𝛾𝛾 − 𝜃𝜃. If the first mover rejects the offer, the surplus is destroyed and the 
total payoffs to the first and second mover are 𝜔𝜔1–  𝜑𝜑 and 𝜔𝜔2, respectively.3  
     This interaction exhibits an inefficiency associated with non-contractible relation specific 
investment commonly referred to as the hold-up problem. To see this, assume both players are 
rational payoff maximizers. At stage 1, the first mover will only choose to invest ex ante if they 
believe they will receive an offer greater than or equal to their sunk cost of investment. However, 
if the first mover chooses to invest, they would be willing to accept any non-negative offer for 
the second mover at stage 3. Knowing this, the second mover can behave opportunistically and 
offer 𝜃𝜃 = 0. Anticipating the second mover’s opportunism, the first mover will not invest at 
stage 1. 
     Although standard theory assumes agents are selfish, a large literature in economics finds that 
individuals exhibit other-regarding preferences (see Cooper & Kagel, 2016 for a review). The 
idea that such preferences can resolve the hold-up problem has received considerable attention, 
                                                 
     3 Figure F.1 in Appendix F provides an extensive form representation of the hold-up game. 
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and experimental evidence provides some support for this claim (Hackett, 1994; Dufwenberg et 
al., 2013; Ellingsen et al. 2004b; Sloof et al. 2007). For example, an other-regarding first mover 
may choose to invest and trade because they prefer efficiency (Charness & Rabin, 2002), or they 
might receive some altruism payoff (Andreoni 1989) from investing. An other-regarding second 
mover might also make investment worthwhile for the first mover by choosing an offer 𝜃𝜃 > 𝜑𝜑 
because of their own altruism or sense of fairness even if the first mover would accept an offer 
such that 𝜃𝜃 = 0. Conversely, motivated by their own sense of fairness. first movers may and 
reject some nonnegative offers that are viewed to be unfair out of spite. Fear that low offers will 
be rejected could put upward pressure on the second mover’s offer and rationalize first mover 
investment at stage 1. 
     In this study, we consider the sequential game above under two endowment conditions. In the 
symmetric endowment condition (denote SE), first and second movers begin the game with 
respective endowments 𝜔𝜔1 and 𝜔𝜔2 such that 𝜔𝜔1 = 𝜔𝜔2. This implies that a first mover who 
invests enters the bargain 𝜑𝜑 units behind the second mover in the earnings distribution. Players 
in the asymmetric endowment condition (denote AE) begin the game with endowments such that 
𝜔𝜔1 = 𝜔𝜔2 + 𝜑𝜑, which implies that an investing first mover enters the bargain with earnings equal 
to that of the second mover. 
     While standard theory predicts the same behavior in either case, the difference in initial 
wealth may influence the behavior of other-regarding agents.  For example, previous 
experiments have shown that a responder’s MWTA in the ultimatum game is increasing with 
their relative earnings (Armentier, 2006), and that individuals exhibit an aversion to being at the 
bottom of the earnings distribution of their respective group (Kuziemko et al, 2014).  By 
allowing the first mover to begin with a sufficiently larger endowment than the second mover, 
the first mover will not fall “behind,” even if bargaining breaks down. So, we might expect 
greater investment in AE than SE. 
     Egalitarian social preferences may also incentivize investment through their influence on the 
second mover’s offer as shown by Ellingsen et al., (2004b).  Specifically, they show that a 
second mover sufficiently averse to advantageous inequality will maximize their utility by 
choosing an offer ?̿?𝜃 that results in equal payoffs for the pair. We can write the payoff equalizing 
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offer in SE as ?̿?𝜃 = 𝛾𝛾+𝜑𝜑
2
, which is greater than 𝜑𝜑. Otherwise second movers will choose an offer 
equal to the first mover’s MWTA at stage 3, which is weakly less than half of the gross surplus 
and does not reimburse the first mover’s cost of investment.4  
     However, Ellingsen et al., (2004b) only considers cases in which players begin the game with 
equal endowments which leaves the first mover behind the second mover in the earnings 
distribution at stage 2. With equal earnings at stage two, the payoff equalizing offer in AE is 
simply half of the gross surplus which does not reimburse the first mover. Nevertheless, the first 
mover would accept this offer at stage three since it yields both a higher absolute payoff for 
themselves and equal payoffs for the pair. This means that inequality aversion can explain offers 
that reimburse the first mover’s cost of investment in SE, but is cannot explain these offers in 
AE. 
     Yet another possibility is that agents care about reciprocal fairness independent of the final 
distribution of payoffs. For simplicity, we assume investment is kind and that reciprocity is 
violated if the second mover chooses an offer that would leave the first mover worse off than 
they would have been had they chosen not to invest (for works that take a similar approach, see 
Coleman (1990)). This implies that a second mover might choose an offer greater than or equal 
to 𝜑𝜑 to reciprocate the first mover’s kindness, while an offer less than 𝜑𝜑 might be rejected by a 
first mover out of spite. Given that endowment heterogeneity has no influence on the first 
mover’s sunk cost of investment, reciprocity can motivate reimbursement in either of our 
endowment conditions. 
3. EXPERIMETNAL DESIGN 
     All experiment sessions were conducted using the Ztree software (Fischbacher, 2007) the 
University of Tennessee at Knoxville (UTK) and Southwest Petroleum University in Chengdu, 
China (SWPU). Subjects in each location were recruited from a variety of introductory courses. 
A total of 300 subjects (132 at UTK and 168 at SWPU) took part in 25 experiment sessions (11 
at UTK and 14 at SWPU) that were conducted between November 2017 and July 2019. Earnings 
                                                 
     4 A first mover will accept any offer of Rejecting an offer greater than this amount at stage 3 results in both a 
higher absolute payoff and greater disadvantageous inequality than would acceptance.  
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in both locations were described in terms of experimental currency units (ECU) throughout the 
experiment and paid in terms of the local currency at a respective conversion rate of $0.05 and 
¥0.15 per ECU. Each session took approximately 45 minutes to complete, and the average 
earnings for subjects across all sessions was 235 ECU. 
     At the beginning of each session subjects were instructed not to communicate with one 
another during the experiment, and informed that time would be provided for questions before 
subjects made any decisions that may affect their earnings. Written instructions in the home 
country’s language were provided prior to each task and read aloud to all participants by the 
experimenter. Subjects were then randomly sorted into pairs for a one-shot hold-up game 
between a “first mover” and a “second mover”.5 Using the strategy method, participants 
submitted decisions as a first and second mover decisions at each node of the hold-up game 
before the computer randomly assigned roles at random to determine earnings. This allows us to 
observe 300 unique observations regarding investment decisions and offers that can be used to 
compare behavior across treatments. 
     Subjects submitted their strategies for the hold-up game with their mouse and keyboard on 
two decision screens. On their first decision screen, subjects stated the strategies they would like 
to play if assigned the role of first mover. Each subject stated whether they would like to invest 
60 ECU at stage 1 in surplus worth 90 ECU to the second mover but worth 0 ECU to themselves. 
If they chose not to invest, no other decision was made on the first decision screen. If they chose 
to invest, subjects were also asked to state the smallest offer they would be willing to accept 
(MWTA) from their match at stage 3. Once all subjects submitted their decisions, the computer 
program progressed each subject to their second decision screen. 
     On the second decision screen, subjects stated the strategies they would like to play if 
assigned the role of second mover. Each subject stated the offer they would like to send at stage 
2 if their match chose to invest. Once each subject submitted their decision, the computer 
assigned roles at random within each pair to calculate earnings.  
                                                 
     5 On both the written instructions and the prompts on their computer screens, the subject with whom one was 
paired was referred to as their “match”. 
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     Earnings for the hold-up game were determined as follows. If the first mover chose not to 
invest, the first and second mover receive a payoff equal to their respective endowment. If the 
first mover chose to invest, 60 ECU was subtracted from their endowment and the bargain was 
implemented. If the second mover’s offer was greater than or equal to the first mover’s MWTA, 
the first mover received a payoff of equal to their endowment minus 60 ECU plus the second 
mover’s offer, and the second mover received a payoff equal to their endowment plus 90 ECU 
minus their offer. If the second mover’s offer was less than the first mover’s MWTA, the first 
mover received a payoff equal to their endowment minus 60 ECU, and the second mover 
received a payoff equal to their endowment. 
     The endowments assigned to first and second movers varied across sessions in each location. 
In our symmetric endowment condition (SE), both first and second movers received an 
endowment equal to 100 ECU. In our asymmetric endowment condition (AE), first mover 
received an endowment 60 ECU greater than the second mover’s endowment.6 
     Before learning any of the outcomes from the hold-up game, subjects took part in a lottery 
task from Eckel and Grossman (2008) and an augmented dictator game from Charness and Rabin 
(2002) to elicit risk and social preferences, respectively.7 Once subjects completed these tasks, 
we asked them to fill out a post experiment questionnaire before receiving their earnings 
privately in cash on their way out of the lab.   
4. HYPOTHESES  
     According to standard theory, the outcome of the hold-up game is not a function of relative 
wealth. Since previous work has argued that social preference theories based on relative payoff 
utility measures can explain deviations from standard theoretical predictions, we ask whether 
heterogeneity in endowments will influence individual behavior and group-level outcomes in this 
                                                 
     6 Originally, there were two asymmetric endowments conditions. In the “first-mover-high” (or FMH) condition, 
the first mover received an endowment equal to 160 ECU and the second mover was assigned an endowment of 100 
ECU. In the “second-mover-low” (or SML) condition, the first mover received an endowment equal to 100 ECU and 
the second mover received an endowment equal to 40 ECU. Because behavior in each within each location was 
nearly identical in FMH and SML conditions, we pooled these observations within each location under AE. For 
more details, see Tables F.2, F.3, and F.4 and in Appendix F.  
     7 In Appendix F, Tables F.5 and F.6 provide the decisions facing subjects in each task along with country specific 
means for each response.  
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decision setting. To do this, we compare individual behavior and group-level outcomes in the 
hold-up game across our symmetric and asymmetric endowment conditions. Then we investigate 
whether the culture affects behavior, controlling to some extent for social preferences, by 
comparing the behavior of subjects from two different subject pools with salient differences in 
national culture (students in the US and China). In subsections 4.1 and 4.2 respectively, we 
discuss our hypotheses regarding each of these comparisons and test them in Section 5. 
4.1 Endowment conditions 
     Individual behavior in our experiment is captured by each subject’s investment decision as a 
first mover at stage 1, each subject’s offer decision as a second mover at stage 2, and the MWTA 
at stage 3 from each subject that chose to invest as a first mover. According to standard theory, 
these decisions are not a function of relative wealth and predicts that these decisions will not 
differ significantly across endowment conditions. We summarize these predictions below, in 
Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3.  
Hypothesis 1. For both locations, investment rates in SE and AE will be the same.  
Hypothesis 2. For both locations, offers in SE and AE will be the same.  
Hypothesis 3. For both locations, the MWTA in SE and AE will be the same.   
     We additionally investigate the frequency with which the second mover chooses an offer that 
fully reimburses the first mover’s investment. Consistent with the notion of “reciprocity” 
discussed in the introduction (Coleman, 1990), we report average rates of reimbursement, the 
percentage of offers that equal or exceed the cost of investment (60).  Equals rates of 
reimbursement is implied by Hypothesis 2, and so we do not state this as an additional 
hypothesis.  
     Now that we’ve addressed behavior at the individual level for all three stages of the hold-up 
game, we turn our attention to the efficiency of outcomes at the group level. According to 
standard theory, group earnings in both endowment conditions will not change and thus be the 
same across treatments. We summarize this prediction below in Hypothesis 4.  
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Hypothesis 4. For both locations, group-level earnings and the rate of bargaining success 
(conditional on investment) will each be the same across the SE and AE conditions. 
     From our discussion in Section 2, we know that social preferences could explain some 
deviations from these hypotheses. For example, inequality aversion clearly predicts that some 
subjects will choose offers that result in equal payoffs which reimburse the first mover in SE but 
not AE. To address this, we take a look at offer distributions to see if subjects chose such offers 
in either treatment. We also report average rates of reimbursement, the percentage of offers that 
equal or exceed the cost of investment (60), and compare them across endowment conditions. 
However, since equals rates of reimbursement is implied by Hypothesis 2, and so we do not state 
this as an additional hypothesis. 
4.2 US and China sessions 
     Next, we address the potential for differences in behavior across sample populations in the US 
and China. Economic theory assumes that behavior in the hold-up game is invariant to 
differences in national culture. However, the international business literature finds that Chinese 
and American cultures respectively, rank among the most collectivistic and individualistic 
cultures in the world,8 and researchers find that these sentiments can have a significant influence 
on organizational behavior (Hofstede 1980; 1984; Hofstede 2011; Triandis 1998).  
     Like many collectivist cultures, tacit reciprocal obligations are the norm in China and are well 
understood by American executives with experience working in the region (Fock & Woo 1998).9 
Meanwhile, individualist cultures (like the US) view positive reciprocity as desirable but not to 
be expected from oneself or others without an explicit agreement a priori (Hofstede, 2001). This 
is one-way researchers explain their finding that managers in China are less reliant than others on 
                                                 
     8 Out of 76 countries investigated, Hofstede et al. (2011) rank the United States as the most individualistic 
national culture followed by Australia and the UK (two other nations with Anglo-Saxon roots), while China was 
ranked as the most collectivistic.  
     9 Specifically, researchers call attention to the Chinese concept of guanxi (Chen, Chen & Huang 2013; Yang, 
2016), which refers to social norms that stress the importance of maintaining social harmony in relationships 
through cooperation and reciprocal obligations between parties in pursuit of mutually beneficial exchange (Luo, 
Ying & Wang, 2012). While western conceptions of trust rely on individual beliefs regarding the goodwill of others 
(Yagamashi & Yagamiashi, 1994), guanxi establishes norms for positive reciprocity more akin to assurance in 
exchange relationships (Standifird & Marshall, 2000). As Park and Luo (2001) note, “the rules of reciprocity in 
guanxi establish a structural constraint that curtails self-seeking opportunism,” helping firms acquire crucial 
resources and overcome institutional shortfalls. 
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detailed contracts or formal institutions to achieve efficiency in relational exchange, and firms in 
the US and Western Europe invest considerable resources into both (Luo, 2007; Xin & Pearce, 
1996).  
     Cross-cultural experiments work in the economics literature have also found that subjects in 
China tend to exhibit more cooperation and positive reciprocity than those from Anglo-American 
cultures. For example, both Buchan et al. (2002) and Buchan & Johnson et al. (2006) find that 
Chinese second movers in the investment game send larger amounts back to investors and send 
positive amounts at a higher rate which demonstrates a greater tendency toward positive 
reciprocity. Chuah et al. (2007; 2009) find that subjects in China make significantly larger offers 
as proposers in the ultimatum game, while others have found that Chinese subjects exhibit 
greater rates of cooperation in prisoner’s dilemmas (Hemesath & Pomponio, 1998; Wong et al., 
2005).  
     For the reasons discussed above, it would not be surprising to find differences in behavior 
across cultures. We nevertheless maintain the predictions of standard economic theory as our 
baseline hypotheses, which is that there should be no difference in behavior across countries.  
Hypothesis 5: Investment rates in the US and China will be the same.   
Hypothesis 6. Offers in the US and China will be the same.  
Hypothesis 7. The MWTA for subjects in the US and China will be the same.  
Hypothesis 8. Group-level earnings and the rate of bargaining success (conditional on 
investment) will be the same across the US and China. 
     The following section reports results testing Hypotheses 1 through 4 using data from subjects 
in the US and China, respectively. Then we use observations from both locations to further test 






5. RESULTS  
5.1 US Sessions 
     Table E.1 reports US sample means regarding individual behavior in the hold-up game from 
our symmetric (USE) and asymmetric (UAE) endowment conditions. Here we can see that 31 of 
the 68 subjects in USE chose to invest as first movers which yields an investment rate of 45.6%. 
At stage 3, these subjects required an average of 45.6 ECU MWTA to engage in trade. The 
average offer chosen in USE was 49.9 ECU, and 48.5% of these offers were greater than or equal 
to the first mover’s cost of investment.  
     In UAE, we find that 35 of 64 subjects chose to invest as first movers yielding an investment 
rate of 54.7%. On average, investing subjects demanded 47.3 ECU to engage in trade at stage 3. 
Subjects in UAE offered an average of 49.8 ECU, and only 28.8% of these offers were greater 
than or equal to the first mover’s cost of investment. Distribution plots of Offers and MWTA 
across endowment conditions for our US sample can be found in Figure E.1.  
     We can see from Table E.1 shows that subjects in UAE invested at a higher rate than those in 
USE. However, a two-sample Fisher’s exact test of proportions reveals that this difference in 
investment rates across endowment conditions is not significant (two-sided p-value = 0.296). So, 
the US data fails to reject our first hypothesis. 
Finding 1: Subjects chose to invest at similar rates in USE and UAE. 
     Our second hypothesis states that subjects will choose similar offers across endowment 
conditions. Referring again to Table E.1 we see that the mean offer was similar for US subjects 
across endowment conditions, though a larger proportion of offers in USE would reimburse the 
first mover’s cost of investment. An unequal variances t-test rejects the alternative hypothesis 
that mean offers were unequal across endowment conditions (p-value = 0.973). However, if we 
take a look at the offer distributions in Figure E.1, we can see that the mode of each distribution, 
respectively, is equal to the payoff equalizing offer (75 ECU in SE; 45 ECU in AE). This shift is 
reflected in the reimbursement rates reported in Table E.1, and two-sample Fisher’s exact test of 
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proportions finds that the difference in reimbursement rates across endowment conditions is 
statistically significant at the 5% level (two-sided p-value = 0.016). 
Finding 2: The reimbursement rate was larger in USE than in UAE. However, mean offers were 
similar in USE and UAE.   
     We also hypothesized that investing subjects would require similar offers (MWTA) across 
endowment conditions to engage in trade. Table E.1 shows that subjects in UAE required an 
average of only 1.7 ECU more that subjects in USE. An unequal variances t-test reveals that the 
difference in mean MWTA across USE and UAE is far from significant (p-value =0.676). 
Therefore, the US data fails to reject Hypothesis 3.  
Finding 3: Means for MWTA were similar in USE and UAE.   
     The subgame perfect prediction of the hold-up game is that efficient investment will not take 
place.  To test Hypothesis 4, we consider the change in group earnings associated with each 
outcome, ∆Group Earnings, and compare it across endowment conditions.  Recall that “No 
Investment” leaves both players with their respective endowments (∆Group Earnings = 0), 
“Successful Trade” increases earnings for the pair by the net surplus from investment (∆Group 
Earnings = +30 ECU), and “Bargaining Failure” conditional on investment decreases earnings 
for the pair by the first mover’s cost of investment (∆Group Earnings = −60 ECU). Thus, 
conditional on investment, buyers and sellers must reach an agreement in more than two thirds of 
the time in order to achieve greater efficiency than theory predicts.  
     Figure E.2 plots a histogram of outcomes for the hold-up game from US sessions, and here 
we see little difference across endowment conditions.. In Table E.2, we report mean estimates of 
∆Group Earnings derived from a linear regression using the 132 iterations of the hold-up game 
(recall that each subject made decisions as a first mover and a second mover) that we observe in 
our US sample. It is important to note that these observations are not independent given that each 
outcome of the hold-up game depends on the decisions made by both subjects within a given 
pair. To account for this when comparing outcomes across treatments, we cluster the standard 
errors by pair.  
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     Our fourth hypothesis addresses efficiency across endowment conditions, which is measured 
by the average change in group earnings. We find that ∆Group Earnings decreased by 
approximately 4.9 ECU in USE, while group earnings decreased by 1.9 ECU in UAE. However, 
a Wald test fails to detect a significant difference in means across endowment conditions (p-
value = 0.630). Thus, we find no difference in efficiency across endowments. 
     In addition to ∆Group Earnings, Table E.2 reports the rate at which stage 1 investments 
resulted in successful trade (Successful Trade). Here we can see that 54.8% of investments made 
by US subjects in SE result in successful trade, while 62.9% of investments from AE result in 
successful trade.  A Wald test comparing these rates across endowment conditions fails to reject 
the null hypothesis of equality (p-value = 0.553). Thus, we do not find that US subject pairs were 
significantly more or less likely to trade successfully in either endowment condition.   
Finding 4: Group-level earnings and the rate of bargaining success (conditional on investment) 
were similar in USE and UAE. 
     After the hold-up game, subjects in each session completed the lottery and sequential 
dichotomous dictator tasks. Table E.3 reports US sample means for the risk and social preference 
parameters we derived from their responses in each task, respectively. Since individual decisions 
in the hold-up game influence earnings for the pair and are made prior to learning those of one’s 
trading partner, we examine the extent to which behavior in the hold-up game is related to the 
risk and social preference parameters we elicited from subjects in each session using regression 
analysis.10  
     Results from linear regressions with a dummy variable for Invest on the left-hand side and a 
fixed effect for UAE on the right-hand side of each regression are reported in Table E.4, while 
additional controls for risk and social preferences differ across specifications. Here we find that 
the effect of UAE in our US sample is insignificant across all specifications. We also fail to 
detect a significant difference in investment associated with gender, risk aversion, prosocial 
preferences, inequality aversion or competitive social preferences. 
                                                 
     10 The leftmost column of Table E.3 reports two-sided Fisher’s exact p-values from comparisons of each 
proportion across endowment conditions in our US sample. Given that each of these p-values is greater than or equal 
to 0.201, we find that US subjects exhibit similar risk and social preferences across endowment conditions. 
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     To investigate the factors affecting Offer we provide linear regressions with it as the 
dependent variable in Table E.5. Each regression includes a fixed effect for UAE while 
additional controls vary across specifications. Much like the results reported in Table E.4, we fail 
to detect a significant difference in means for Offer across treatments, and we fail to detect a 
significant relationship between Offer and our preference parameters. We also investigate the 
potential relationship between Offer and the subjects’ investment decision as a first mover, but 
fail to detect a significant relationship between the two.  
     Our hypotheses do not specifically address the likelihood that a second mover will reimburse 
the first mover for the cost of the investment by making a fully reimbursing offer that is greater 
than or equal to 60.  Nevertheless, we found a highly treatment effect on such reimbursing offers.  
To investigate the robustness of this such behavior, Table E.6 reports results from linear 
regressions similar to those in Table E.5, but with Reimburse as the dependent variable in each 
specification. We fail to detect a significant relationship between Reimburse and our preference 
parameters individually, or when include multiple controls in other specifications.  However, we 
do find that the coefficient associated with our asymmetric endowment treatment is negative and 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level (all p-values < 0.022) across model specifications. 
These results provide further support for Finding 2, that second movers were less likely to fully 
reimburse first movers in the asymmetric endowment treatment UAE.   
     Finally, we conclude this section by examining the potential relationships of an investing first 
movers minimum willing to accept with risk preferences, social preferences, and their offers as 
second movers. Here we find results from linear regressions with MWTA as the dependent 
variable. Again, we fail to detect a significant relationship between MWTA and our preference 
parameters.  However, Specification 5 in Table E.7 examines the relationship between Offer and 
MWTA, and estimates a positive and significant correlation between the two (p-value = 0.001). 
This effect is robust to controls for risk preferences, social preferences as well as gender, and we 
examine this relationship further in Figure E.3. 
     Figure E.3 presents a two-way scatter plot of (Offer, MWTA) for our US sample, along with a 
linear prediction of MWTA conditional on Offer. Here we can see an upward trend in MWTA as 
Offer increases, and this intuition is confirmed by a positive and significant slope coefficient (p-
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value = 0.000) and a Spearman’s rank correlation test between the two variables (p-value = 
0.000). Thus, it appears that a larger MWTA as an investing first mover is associated with a 
choosing a larger offer for one’s partner as a second mover.  
5.2 China Sessions 
     In this section we test our hypothesis using the data collected from subjects in China.  Table 
E.8 reports China sample means regarding individual behavior in the hold-up game from each 
endowment condition. Here we can see that 41 of the 72 subjects in CSE (56.9%) chose to invest 
as first movers and these subjects required an average of 57.5 ECU to engage in trade. The 
average offer chosen in CSE was 60.5 ECU, and 68.1% of these offers were greater than or equal 
to the first mover’s cost of investment. In AE, we find that 52 of 96 subjects in China chose to 
invest as first movers yielding an investment rate of 54.2%. On average, investing subjects 
demanded 54.3 ECU to engage in trade at stage 3, while subjects in CAE offered an average of 
56.3 ECU to the first mover. Distribution plots of Offers and MWTA across endowment 
conditions for our China sample can be found in Figure E.4. 
     In our China sample, subjects in SE invested at a higher rate than those in AE. However, a 
two-sample Fisher’s exact test of proportions reveals that this difference in investment rates 
across endowment conditions is not significant (p-value = 0.720).  
Finding 5: Subjects chose to invest at similar rates in CSE and CAE. 
     Our second hypothesis states that subjects will choose similar offers across endowment 
conditions. Table E.8 shows that the average offer in CSE was 4.2 ECU higher than it was in 
CAE, and that a larger proportion of offers in CSE would reimburse the first mover’s cost of 
investment. An unequal variances t-test fails to reject the null hypothesis that offers were equal 
across endowment conditions (p-value = 0.172). However, if we take a look at the offer 
distributions in Figure E.4, we can see that the frequency of offers equal to 45 ECU increases 
from SE to AE which if the payoff equalizing offer when endowments are asymmetric. This shift 
is reflected in the reimbursement rates reported in Table E.4, and a two-sample Fisher’s exact 
test of proportions finds that the difference in reimbursement rates across endowment conditions 
is significant at the 5% level (two-sided p-value = 0.037).  
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Finding 6: The reimbursement rate was significantly greater in CSE than CAE. The mean offer 
was also larger in CSE than CAE, but the difference is not significant.  
     We also hypothesized that investing subjects require similar offers across endowment 
conditions to engage in trade at stage 3. Referring to Table E.8 we can see that the average 
MWTA in CSE was 3.2 ECU larger than in CAE.  An unequal variances t-test fails to reject the 
null hypothesis that the mean MWTA is equal across endowment conditions (p-value = 0.452). 
Therefore, the China data also fails to reject Hypothesis 3.  
Finding 7: Means for MWTA were similar in CSE than in CAE.  
     Now we shift our attention to the outcomes of our hold-up game.  Figure E.5 shows the 
proportion of matches in our China sample that ended with no investment, successful trade and 
bargaining failure across endowment conditions. As noted previously in Finding E.5, subjects in 
China exhibited similar rates of investment across endowment conditions which implies a similar 
proportion of games ending with no investment. Of the subjects who did choose to invest, the 
game concluded with successful trade or bargaining failure.  
     Our fourth hypothesis addresses efficiency across endowment conditions. To test Hypothesis 
4 with our China subject pool, we consider the change in group earnings associated with each 
outcome (∆Group Earnings) and compare ∆Group Earnings across endowment conditions.  
Table E.9 reports the average change in group earnings for subjects in CSE and CAE, 
respectively. Mean estimates of ∆Group Earnings are derived from a linear regression using the 
168 iterations of the hold-up game that we observe in our China sample. It is again important to 
note that these observations are not independent given that each outcome of the hold-up game 
depends on the decisions made by both subjects within a given pair.  
     Figure E.5 plots a histogram of outcomes for the hold-up game from China sessions, and here 
we see little difference across endowment conditions. Referring to Table E.9 we can see that the 
group earnings for each pair in China decreased by approximately 4.2 ECU in SE, while group 
earnings decreased by 3.4 ECU in AE. A Wald test fails to detect a significant difference in 
means across endowment conditions (p-value = 0.897).   
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     In addition to ∆Group Earnings, Table E.9 reports the percentage of successful trades in our 
China sample (Successful Trade). Here we can see that 58.5% of investments made by subjects 
in CSE result in successful trade, while 59.6% of investments from CAE result in successful 
trade. A Wald test comparing these rates across endowment conditions fails to reject the null 
hypothesis of equality (p-value = 0.916). Thus, we do not find that subject pairs in China were 
significantly more likely to bargain successfully in either endowment condition.  
Finding 8: Group-level earnings and the rate of bargaining success (conditional on investment) 
were similar in CSE and CAE.  
     Next, we examine the extent to which behavior in the hold-up game can be explained by the 
risk and social preference parameters elicited from subjects.11 Table E.11 reports results from 
linear regressions with a dummy variable for investment on the left-hand side and a fixed effect 
for subjects in CAE on the right-hand side of each regression, while additional controls for risk 
and social preferences differ across specifications. Here we can see that the coefficient associated 
with CAE is not significant for any of our model specifications. Social preferences have no 
consistent impact across specifications, although inequality aversion and competitiveness have 
negative effects on investment in a few specifications. The only significant estimate is found in 
Specification 5, in which male subjects appear to invest at a significantly lower rate than female 
subjects.  
     To shed some light on the factors influencing Offer, we report results from linear regressions 
with this as our dependent variable in Table E.12. Each regression includes a fixed effect for 
CAE while additional controls vary across specifications. Here we can see that the estimated 
coefficient associated with CAE is positive but insignificant across model specifications (all p-
values > 0.310). Additionally, none of the estimates associated with our controls for risk 
aversion, social preferences or gender reach significance. The only significant relationship 
revealed in Table E.12 is the positive correlation between Invest and Offer. We estimate a 
                                                 
     11 Table E.10 reports China sample means for the risk and social preference parameters. The leftmost column of 
Table E.10 reports two-sided Fisher’s exact p-values from comparisons of each proportion across endowment 
conditions in our China sample. Given that each of these p-values is greater than or equal to 0.393, we find that 
subjects in China exhibit similar risk and social preferences across endowment conditions. 
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positive linear effect associated with Invest that is highly significant and robust to controls for 
risk aversion, social preferences and gender (all p-values <0.04).  
     Panels I and II of Figure F.2 plot the offer distributions of subjects who choose to invest and 
those who do not in the SE and AE treatments, respectively. Here we can see that, in both 
endowment conditions, the offer distribution for subjects that invest lies below the offer 
distribution of those who don’t invest.  A two-sample Mann-Whitney rank-sum test detects a 
significant difference in offers for both endowment conditions (CSE p-value = 0.046; CAE p-
value = 0.049).  
     To examine the potential relationships between our preference parameters and reimbursement 
rates, we report results from linear regressions in Table E.13 with Reimburse as the dependent 
variable. Much like the results reported in Tables E.11 and E.12, we fail to detect a significant 
relationship between Reimburse and our preference parameters individually, or when include 
multiple controls in other specifications.  However, we do find that the coefficient associated 
with our asymmetric endowment treatment is negative and significant across model 
specifications. These results provide further support for Finding 6, indicating that the difference 
in reimbursement rates across endowment conditions is robust to controls for gender, risk 
aversion, and social preferences.  
     We conclude this section by examining the potential relationships of an investing first movers 
the MWTA with risk preferences, social preferences, and their offers as second movers. Table 
E.14 reports results from linear regressions with MWTA as the dependent variable. Much like 
our previous results, we fail to detect a significant relationship between MWTA and our 
demographic controls individually. Much like for our US data, Offer continues to be slightly 
positively correlated with MWTA. Competitive has a significant positive effect in many but not 
all of the specifications. 
     To illustrate this relationship, Figure E.6 presents a two-way scatter plot of (Offer, MWTA), 
along with a linear prediction of MWTA conditional on Offer. Here we can see an upward trend 
in MWTA as Offer increases, and this intuition is confirmed by the significance of our slope 
coefficient (p-value = 0.093) and a Spearman’s rank correlation test between the two variables 
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(p-value = 0.001). Thus, it appears that subjects in China with a larger MWTA as an investing 
first mover also chose larger offers for their trading partner as a second mover.  
5.3 Cross-Country Comparisons 
     In this section we investigate cross country differences in behavior and outcomes. Table E.15 
compares average behavior across US and China subject pools for the symmetric endowment 
treatment (SE) and asymmetric endowment treatment (AE). Recall that, consistent with standard 
economic theory, our baseline hypothesis is that behavior will be similar across locations.  
Hypothesis 5, in particular, states that subjects in China will invest at the same rate as US 
subjects across endowment conditions. Table E.15 shows subjects in CSE invested at a higher 
rate than subjects in USE, but this difference is not statistically significant (two-sided Fisher’s 
exact p-value = 0.179). And there is essentially no difference in investment rates across CAE and 
UAE (p-value = 0.919).  We are unable to reject Hypothesis 5.  
Finding 9: Subjects chose to invest at similar rates across locations. 
     Our sixth hypothesis considers the difference in offers across locations. It states that the offers 
made by subjects in our China sessions will be similar to those made by subjects in our US 
sessions, but this is not what we find. Table E.15 shows that the average offer chosen by subjects 
in China was larger than those chosen by US subjects in both endowment treatments, 
respectively. In each case, an unequal variances t-test finds that the difference in offers across 
locations is statistically significant (SE p-value = 0.004; AE p-value = 0.018). The same is also 
true with respect to reimbursement rates with subjects in China choosing offers greater than the 
first mover’s cost of investment at a significantly higher rate in SE (two-sided Fisher’s exact p-
value = 0.019), AE (two-sided Fisher’s exact p-value = 0.003). Thus, we reject Hypothesis 6.  
Finding 10: Subjects in China chose significantly larger offers and reimbursed the first mover’s 
cost of investment at significantly higher rate than US subjects in both endowment conditions.  
     Our seventh hypotheses states that the MWTA of subjects who chose to invest as first movers 
will be similar across locations. In contrast with this hypothesis, Table E.15 shows that subjects 
in China require larger offers to engage in trade at stage 3 than US subjects in both endowment 
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conditions. An unequal variances t-test reveals that the difference in MWTA is significant in 
both SE (p-value = 0.018) and AE (p-value = 0.044). We therefore reject Hypothesis 7.   
Finding 11: Subjects in China who invested required larger offers (MWTA) to engage in trade 
than US subjects in both endowment conditions.   
     Now we turn our attention to Hypothesis 8, which states that the efficiency of group level 
outcomes will be equivalent across locations. Table E.16 reports results from linear regressions 
with ∆Group Earnings and Successful Trade respectively, as the dependent variable. We use 
dummy variables to estimate mean differences across locations in each of our endowment 
treatments and cluster standard errors by pairs.12  
     The estimates in Table E.16 show that, on average, ∆Group Earnings was greater for subject 
pairs in China than it was for subjects in the US in both symmetric and asymmetric endowment 
settings. However, we fail to detect a significant difference in ∆Group Earnings across locations 
in either endowment condition (SE p-value = 0.897; AE p-value = 0.971). Below our estimates 
for ∆Group Earnings, we report results from regressions comparing Successful Trade across 
locations and find similar results. A larger proportion of investments from subjects in CSE result 
in successful trade, while the opposite is true in AE. Once again, our results reveal that the rate 
of successful trade does not differ significantly across locations in either our symmetric 
endowment treatment (p-value = 0.755) or our asymmetric endowment treatment (p-value = 
0.975). Thus, we are unable to reject Hypothesis 8.  
Finding 12: Group-level earnings and the rate of bargaining success (conditional on investment) 
were similar in the US and China.  
     Our findings above suggest that bargaining behavior differed significantly across locations in 
both endowment conditions, but that these differences did not result in significantly different 
outcomes with respect to efficiency. Now that we’ve tested our main hypothesis of interest 
across locations, we consider whether differences we do observe across locations can be 
explained by differences in either risk or social preferences. To do this, we first compare the risk 
                                                 




and social preferences parameters derived from our lottery task and sequential dictator game 
across locations.  Then we employ regression analysis and capture differences in behavior across 
locations with dummy variables.  
     Sample means of each preference parameter for each location are reported in Table E.17. 
Here we can see that a two-sample Fisher’s exact test of proportions finds that Risk Aversion is 
statistically equivalent across locations (p-value = 0.743). Examining decisions in our social 
preference elicitation, we see significant differences across locations. For example, while 32.7% 
of subjects in China exhibited a prosocial preference for efficiency, in contrast with 58.33% of 
US subjects and this difference in proportions is highly significant (two-sided Fisher’s exact p-
value = 0.000). The small difference in the percentage of inequality averse agents across 
countries is not statistically significant (p-value = 0.687). However, we also find a larger 
proportion of subjects in China exhibit competitive social preferences and this difference is 
statistically significant (two-sided Fisher’s exact p-value = 0.017).  
     Given our results in Table E.17, we use regression analysis to examine behavior in the hold-
up game across locations while controlling for differences in preference parameters. Tables E.18-
21 reports results from linear regressions with Invest, Offer, Reimburse, and MWTA as our 
dependent variables, respectively. In each model specification, we include a fixed effect for our 
asymmetric endowment treatment. This allows us to capture cross-country differences in hold-up 
game behavior in each endowment treatment with interaction terms China*SE and China*AE.    
     The first cross country comparison we examine is the difference in investment rates. Table 
E.18 reports linear regressions with Invest as our dependent variable.  As was true above, we fail 
to detect a significant difference in investment rates across locations. Additionally, the 
preference parameters do not provide much explanatory power, though there is weak evidence 
that inequality averse and competitive preferences are associated with a lower probability of 
investment.  
     Next, we take a look at our regression analysis with respect to offers in Table E.19. Here we 
find that mean difference in Offer between subjects in China and the US remain positive and 
statistically significant in each endowment condition across locations (all p-values <0.041). We 
fail to detect a significant relationship between Offer and any of our demographic controls for 
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gender, risk aversion, or social preferences. In Specifications 6 and 7, we estimate a significant 
and positive coefficient associated with investment (p-value = 0.004) that remains significant in 
subsequent specifications when additional preference and gender controls are included on the 
right-hand side.   
     In addition to Offer, we would also like to investigate the factors affecting the probability that 
a second mover’s offer fully reimburses the first mover’s cost of investment (60). To do this, we 
report results from linear regressions results Reimburse as our dependent variable in Table E.20. 
These results show that the previously documented differences in Reimbursement frequency 
across endowment treatments and countries are robust after controlling for risk and social 
preferences.  
     Finally, we take another look at the differences in MWTA across locations and test whether 
these differences are robust to our controls for risk and social preferences. Table E.21 reports 
results from regressions with MWTA as our dependent variable. Here we can see that the 
differences in MWTA between CSE and the baseline USE are robust after controlling for gender, 
risk preferences, and social preferences. The difference in MWTA between CAE and the baseline 
UAE are robust controls for risk preferences (p-value = 0.092) and inequality aversion (p-value = 
0.089), but this difference is no longer significant when controls for competitive (p-value = 
0.146) or prosocial preferences (p-value = 0.160) are included.  Specifications 6 and 7 report a 
positive and significant estimated coefficient associated with Offer (p-value = 0.000).   
     Taken together, the results from our regression analysis show that Findings 9 and 10 are 
robust to our controls for risk and social preferences. We also find that the difference in MWTA 
across locations in our symmetric endowment treatment reported in Finding 11 is robust to these 
controls, though the difference observed in our asymmetric endowment treatment loses 
significance when we account for prosocial and competitive social preferences. Specifically, we 
find that the smaller mean MWTA for subjects in UAE (relative to CAE) can be partially 
explained by their prosocial preference for efficiency, and the relatively large mean MWTA for 
subjects in CAE can be partially attributed to their competitiveness.13 The fact that we observe 
                                                 
     13 The sample variances in both USE and CSE are larger than those in UAE and CAE, respectively. A variance 
ratio test finds that the difference in variance across endowment conditions is marginally significant in both our US 
sessions (p-value = 0.098) and China sessions (p-value = 0.074). Thus, it could be the case that we simply need a 
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this mediation effect in one endowment treatment and not the other may be due to the relatively 
low variance of MWTA in our asymmetric endowment treatment. Nevertheless, our estimates 
show that there are differences in bargaining behavior across locations that can be explained by 
differences in national culture, independent of risk and social preferences.   
6. CONCLUSION 
     This paper has attempted to investigate investment and bargaining behavior in the hold-up 
game with two new design contributions. We implement a one-shot hold-up game under 
symmetric and asymmetric endowments conditions in two countries with salient differences in 
culture.  Our findings show that subjects in both countries were unable to overcome the hold-up 
problem across treatments, with a negative change in earnings on average, less than the 
theoretical prediction of no investment and no change.   
     Consistent with standard theory, heterogeneous endowments had only minor effects on 
behavior. The only significant difference across endowment conditions is a smaller 
reimbursement rate in AE than SE, and we observe this in both locations. The direction of this 
result is consistent with inequality aversion, and a closer look at the distribution of offers shows 
that a considerable proportion of subjects in each location chose offers that would results in 
equal payoffs for the pair. However, we still observe a considerable proportion of offers that 
reimburse the first mover’s cost of investment in AE, which can be explained by reciprocity but 
not inequality aversion. From this we conclude that both motives can explain much of what we 
observe in the hold-up game at the individual level, but their presence did not result in greater 
efficiency. 
     When examining first and second mover decisions across locations, we find that subjects in 
our US and China sessions invest at similar rates but exhibit significant differences in bargaining 
behavior that are robust to our controls for risk and social preferences. Our results show that 
second movers in China made larger offers than their US counterparts in both treatments, and 
that they chose offers that reimbursed the first movers cost of investment at a higher rate. We 
also find that the first movers in China demanded larger payments to engage in trade at stage 3, 
                                                 
larger sample in our asymmetric endowment treatment to identify the difference in MWTA across locations, 
independent of prosocial and competitive social preferences. 
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which is why we observe similar rates of bargaining failure and similar group earnings across 
locations.  These differences are consistent with previous experiments (Buchan et al., 2002; 
2006)) finding subjects in China exhibiting greater concern for reciprocity than US subjects, but 
our findings suggest that this does not translate into greater efficiency in the hold-up game.   
     In addition to comparing behavior across our four treatment conditions, we also report some 
interesting results regarding first and second mover behavior in experimental hold-up games. For 
instance, subjects who invest as first movers make larger offers than those who don’t. We also 
find that investing subjects in both locations who make larger offers also demand larger offers to 
engage in trade at stage 3. These results are consistent with previous experiments that find 
subjects who exhibit trust also exhibit trustworthiness (Johnson & Mislin, 2011), and that 
cooperative subjects have higher expectations regarding the cooperativeness of others (Guth et 
al., 2014; Sapienza et al., 2013).  
     To conclude, we agree with Chuah et al. (2007; 2009) and Deck, Farmer and Zeng (2009) that 
in an increasingly globalized market place, more research is needed to better understand cultural 
differences bargaining and organizational behavior. We believe that our paper provides a 
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Table E.1: Summary Statistics (US) 
 USE UAE p-value 
Investment Rate 31/68 = 45.6% 35/64 = 54.7% (0.296) 
Mean Offer 49.9 ECU 49.8 ECU (0.973) 
Reimbursement Rate 33/68 = 48.5% 18/64 = 28.8% (0.016) 
Mean MWTA 45.6 ECU 47.3 ECU (0.676) 
Notes: Means for each strategy chosen by US subjects in the hold-up game are reported for each endowment 
condition. The p-values associated with Invest and Reimburse are derived from two-sample Fisher’s exact tests of 
proportions with the null hypothesis of equality across endowment conditions. The p-values associated with Offer 






Table E.2:  Earnings and Successful Trade (US) 
 USE UAE Obs. Clusters p-value 
Δ Group Earnings -4.9 ECU -1.9 ECU 132 66 (0.630) 
Successful Trade | Invest = 1 54.8% 62.9% 66 46 (0.553) 
Notes: US sample means for each variable are reported across endowment conditions. Means for “Δ Group 
Earnings” are derived from the linear regression ∆𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖 where 
∆𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 is the change in group earnings associated with the iteration of the holdup game associated 
with player i’s first mover decisions, 𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 is an indicator equal to 1 if player i took part in SE, 𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 is an indicator 
equal to 1 if player i took part in AE, and 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖 is the standard error clustered by pair. Means for “Successful Trade | 
Invest = 1” from similar regressions, but only uses observations for which subject i chose to invest as a first 






Table E.3:  Risk and Social Preferences (US) 
 USE UAE p-value 
Risk Averse 73.5% 71.9% (0.831) 
Prosocial 51.5% 62.5% (0.201) 
Inequality Averse 19.1% 15.6% (0.597) 
Competitive 13.2% 10.9% (0.686) 
Notes: US sample means for each variable are reported across endowment conditions. (p-values are derived two-




Table E.4: Linear Regressions on “Invest” (US Data) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
AE .09 .09 .09 .09 .09 
 (.09) (.09) (.09) (.09) (.09) 
Risk Averse .04    .03 
 (.10)    (.1) 
Prosocial  .04   -.05 
  (.09)   (.13) 
Ineq. Averse   -.07  -.12 
   (.12)  (.16) 
Competitive    -.07 -.13 
    (.13) (.18) 
Male     -.05 
     (.09) 
Constant .43*** .44*** .47*** .46*** .53*** 
 (.09) (.08) (.06) (.06) (.16) 
Notes: Estimates are derived from the linear regression 𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝐼𝐼 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 + 𝜖𝜖 where our dependent variable is an 
indicator variable for investment, 𝛽𝛽 is our matrix of independent variables, and  𝜖𝜖 is a matrix of i.i.d. error 
terms. Only observations from our US sample are included. Standard errors for each estimate are reported in 


























Table E.5: Linear Regressions on “Offer” (US Data) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
AE 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.2 -0.2 0.2 
 (3.3) (3.4) (3.3) (3.3) (3.3) (3.4) 
Risk Averse 5.8     5.4 
 (3.7)     (3.9) 
Prosocial  -2.3    -1 
  (3.4)    (5.1) 
Inequality Averse   2.9   3.1 
   (4.4)   (6.1) 
Competitive    1.7  1.3 
    (5.1)  (6.6) 
Male      -1.9 
      (3.5) 
Invest     3.7 3.6 
     (3.3) (3.4) 
Constant 45*** 51*** 49*** 49*** 48*** 45*** 
 (3.6) (2.9) (2.5) (2.4) (2.8) (6.2) 
Notes: Estimates are derived from the linear regression 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 + 𝜖𝜖 where our dependent variable is the 
offer subjects chose as a second mover, 𝛽𝛽 is our matrix of independent variables, and  𝜖𝜖 is a matrix of i.i.d. error 
terms. Only observations from our US sample are included. Standard errors for each estimate are reported in 
























Table E.6: Linear Regressions on “Reimburse” (US Data) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
AE -.20** -.20** -.20** -.20** -.20** -.19** 
 (.08) (.08) (.08) (.08) (.08) (.09) 
Risk Averse -.01     .01 
 (.09)     (.10) 
Prosocial  -.07    -.02 
  (.08)    (.13) 
Inequality Averse   .10   .09 
   (.11)   (.15) 
Competitive    .05  .05 
    (.13)  (.17) 
Male      .05 
      (.09) 
Invest     -.09 -.08 
     (.08) (.09) 
Constant .49 .52 .47 .48 .53 .47 
 (.09) (.07) (.06) (.06) (.07) (.16) 
Notes: Estimates are derived from the linear regression 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠𝐼𝐼 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 + 𝜖𝜖 where our dependent variable is an 
indicator equal to 1 if the subject chose an offer greater than or equal to the first mover’s cot of investment, 𝛽𝛽 is 
our matrix of independent variables, and  𝜖𝜖 is a matrix of i.i.d. error terms. Only observations from our US sample 
are included. Standard errors for each estimate are reported in parenthesis. Asterisks indicate the significance of 























Table E.7: Linear Regressions on “MWTA” (US Data) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
AE 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.6 2.6 2.4 
 (4.1) (4.1) (4.1) (4.2) (3.4) (3.4) 
Risk Aversion -3.5     -4.2 
 (4.7)     (3.9) 
Prosocial  -4.1    -4.5 
  (4.2)    (3.8) 
Inequality Aversion   5.8    
   (5.8)    
Competitive    -4.4  -6.2 
    (6.7)  (6.1) 
Male      3.9 
      (3.5) 
Offer     0.6*** 0.5*** 
     (0.1) (0.1) 
Constant 48*** 48*** 45*** 46*** 16*** 21*** 
 (4.6) (4.0) (3.1) (3.1) (5.8) (7.1) 
Notes: Estimates are derived from the linear regression 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 + 𝜖𝜖 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 + 𝜖𝜖 where our dependent 
variable is the MWTA investing subjects chose as a first mover, 𝛽𝛽 is our matrix of independent variables, and  𝜖𝜖 
is a matrix of i.i.d. error terms. The only observations included in each specification are from subjects that both 
chose to invest and are from our US sample. Standard errors for each estimate are reported in parenthesis. 







Table E.8: Summary Statistics (China) 
 CSE CAE p-value 
Investment Rate 41/72 = 56.9% 52/96 = 54.2% (0.720) 
Mean Offer 60.5 ECU 56.3 ECU (0.172) 
Reimbursement Rate 49/72 = 68.1% 50/96 = 52.1% (0.037) 
Mean MWTA 57.5 ECU 54.3 ECU (0.452) 
Notes: Means for each strategy chosen by China subjects in the hold-up game are reported for each 
endowment condition. The p-values associated with Invest and Reimburse are derived from two-sample 
Fisher’s exact tests of proportions with the null hypothesis of equality across endowment conditions. 






Table E.9:  Earnings and Successful Trade (China) 
 SE AE Obs. Clusters p-value 
Δ Group Earnings -4.2 ECU -3.4 ECU 168 84 (0.887) 
Successful Trade | Invest == 1 58.5% 59.6% 93 69 (0.916) 
Notes: China sample means for each variable are reported across endowment conditions. Means for “Δ Group 
Earnings” are derived from the linear regression ∆𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖 where 
∆𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 is the change in group earnings associated with the iteration of the holdup game associated with 
player i’s first mover decisions, 𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 is an indicator equal to 1 if player i took part in SE, 𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 is an indicator equal to 
1 if player i took part in AE, and 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖 is the standard error clustered by pair. Means for “Successful Trade | Invest == 
1” from similar regressions, but only uses observations for which subject i chose to invest as a first mover.  p-values 







Table E.10:  Risk and Social Preferences (China) 
 SE AE p-value 
Risk Averse 75.0% 73.9% (0.878) 
Prosocial 29.1% 35.4% (0.393) 
Inequality Averse 19.4% 17.7% (0.774) 
Competitive 19.4% 21.8% (0.701) 
Notes: China sample means for each variable across endowment conditions. (p-values are derived two-sample 






















Table E.11: Linear Regressions on “Invest” (China Data) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
AE -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
 (.08) (.08) (.08) (.08) (.08) 
Risk Averse 0.06    -0.02 
 (.09)    (.09) 
Prosocial  -0.04   -0.14 
  (.08)   (.10) 
Ineq. Averse   -0.13  -0.24** 
   (.10)  (.11) 
Competitive    -0.05 -0.18* 
    (.10) (.11) 
Male     -0.2** 
     (.08) 
Constant 0.53*** 0.58*** 0.59*** 0.58*** 0.81*** 
 (.09) (.06) (.06 (.06) (.12) 
Notes: Estimates are derived from the linear regression 𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝐼𝐼 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 + 𝜖𝜖 where our dependent variable is an 
indicator variable for investment, 𝛽𝛽 is our matrix of independent variables, and  𝜖𝜖 is a matrix of i.i.d. error 
terms. Only observations from our China sample are included. Standard errors for each estimate are reported in 




















Table E.12: Linear Regressions on “Offer” (China Sessions) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
AE -4.1 -4.2 -4.2 -4.2 -3.8 -3.8 
 (3) (3) (3) (3) (2.8) (2.9) 
Risk Averse -0.4     0.0 
 (3.4)     (3.4) 
Prosocial  0.7    1.8 
  (3.2)    (3.7) 
Ineq. Averse   -3.2   0.0 
   (3.8)   (4.3) 
Competitive    1.0  2.6 
    (3.7)  (4.2) 
Male      3.3 
      (3) 
Invest     12.3*** 13.1*** 
     (2.8) (3) 
Constant 61*** 60*** 61*** 60*** 53*** 50*** 
 (3.4) (2.5) (2.4) (2.4) (2.7) (5.2) 
Notes: Estimates are derived from the linear regression 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 + 𝜖𝜖 where our dependent variable is the 
offer subjects chose as a second mover, 𝛽𝛽 is our matrix of independent variables, and  𝜖𝜖 is a matrix of i.i.d. error 
terms. Only observations from our China sample are included. Standard errors for each estimate are reported in 
























Table E.13: Linear Regressions on “Reimburse” (China Sessions) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
AE -.16** -.16** -.16** -.16** -.15** -.15** 
 (.08) (.08) (.08) (.08) (.07) (.07) 
Risk Averse .07     .10 
 (.09)     (.09) 
Prosocial  .08    .13 
  (.08)    (.09) 
Ineq. Averse   -.13   .01 
   (.10)   (.11) 
Competitive    .06  .14 
    (.09)  (.11) 
Male      .13* 
      (.08) 
Invest     .29*** .32*** 
     (.07) (.07) 
Constant .63*** .66*** .71*** .67*** .52*** .29*** 
 (.09) (.06) (.06) (.06) (.07) (.13) 
Notes: Estimates are derived from the linear regression 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠𝐼𝐼 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 + 𝜖𝜖 where our dependent variable is an 
indicator equal to 1 if the subject chose an offer greater than or equal to the first mover’s cot of investment, 𝛽𝛽 is 
our matrix of independent variables, and  𝜖𝜖 is a matrix of i.i.d. error terms. Only observations from our China 
sample are included. Standard errors for each estimate are reported in parenthesis. Asterisks indicate the 






Table E.14: Linear Regressions on “MWTA” (China Sessions) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
AE -3.6 -2.8 -3.2 -3.7 -2.6 -2.9 
 (4.2) (4.2) (4.2) (4.1) (4.1) (4.2) 
Risk Aversion 3.3     4.9 
 (4.9)     (5) 
Prosocial  -5.9    -5.0 
  (4.5)    (5.1) 
Ineq. Aversion   -1.7   0.3 
   (5.8)   (6.4) 
Competitive    10.6  9.4 
    (5.1)  (5.8) 
Male      3.4 
      (4.4) 
Offer     0.2* 0.2* 
     (0.1) (0.1) 
Constant 55*** 59*** 58*** 56*** 43*** 36*** 
 (4.7) (3.3) (3.2) (3.2) (9.2) (10.6) 
Notes: Estimates are derived from the linear regression 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 + 𝜖𝜖 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 + 𝜖𝜖 where our dependent 
variable is the MWTA investing subjects chose as a first mover, 𝛽𝛽 is our matrix of independent variables, and  𝜖𝜖 
is a matrix of i.i.d. error terms. The only observations included in each specification are from subjects that both 
chose to invest and are from our China sample. Standard errors for each estimate are reported in parenthesis. 








Table E.15: Cross Country Comparisons (Strategies) 
 𝐻𝐻0:𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺 − 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺 = 0  𝐻𝐻0:𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺 − 𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺 = 0  
 Invest 11.36% -0.5% 
 Offer 10.65 ECU** 6.40 ECU** 
 Reimburse 19.53%** 23.96%*** 
MWTA 12.00 ECU** 6.97 ECU* 
 Notes: Estimated test statistics compare values across treatment conditions with asterisks indicating their 
significance (p < 0.1*, < 0.05**, < 0.01***). Estimates associated with Invest and Reimburse are derived from a 








Table E.16:  Cross Country Comparisons (Earnings and Successful Trade) 
  𝐻𝐻0:𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺 − 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺 = 0  𝐻𝐻0:𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺 − 𝑈𝑈𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺 = 0  
Δ Group Earnings 0.7 ECU -1.5 ECU 
  (0.900) (0.740) 
Successful Trade | Invest == 1 3.7% -3.3% 
  (0.754) (.645) 
Notes: Estimated test statistics are derived from linear regressions using the first and second mover decisions 






Table E.17:  Cross Country Comparisons (Risk and Social Preferences) 
 US China p-value 
Risk Averse 70.8% 74.4% (0.743) 
Prosocial 58.33% 32.7% (0.000) 
Inequality Averse 15.6% 18.4% (0.687) 
Competitive 12.1% 20.8% (0.017) 
Notes: China sample means for each variable across endowment conditions. p-values are derived two-sample 

























Table E.18: Linear Regressions on “Invest” (Cross Country Comparisons) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
China*SE .11 .11 .11 .12 .12 .08 
 (.08) (.08) (.09) (.08) (.08) (.09) 
China*AE -.01 -.01 .00 .00 .00 -.04 
 (.08) (.08) (.08) (.08) (.08) (.08) 
Risk Av.  .05    .00 
  (.07)    (.07) 
Prosocial   .00   -.09 
   (.06)   (.08) 
Ineq. Av.    -.09  -.19** 
    (.08)  (.09) 
Comp.     -.08 -.17* 
     (.08) (.09) 
Male      -.16*** 
      (.06) 
AE .09 .09 .09 .09 .09 .09 
 (.09) (.09) (.09) (.09) (.09) (.09) 
Constant .46*** .42*** .45*** .47*** .46*** .67*** 
 (.06) (.08) (.07) (.06) (.06) (.11) 
























Table E.19: Linear Regressions on “Offer” (Cross Country Comparisons) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 
China*SE 10.6*** 10.6*** 10.6*** 10.6*** 10.5*** 9.7*** 10.0*** 
 (3.2) (3.2) (3.3) (3.2) (3.3) (3.2) (3.3) 
China*AE 6.4** 6.4** 6.3** 6.4** 6.2** 6.4** 7.0** 
 (3.1) (3.1) (3.2) (3.1) (3.1) (3) (3.1) 
Risk Av.  2.4     2.9 
  (2.5)     (2.5) 
Prosocial   -0.4    1.5 
   (2.3)    (2.9) 
Ineq. Av.    0.5   3.5 
    (2.9)   (3.5) 
Comp.     1.7  4.1 
     (3)  (3.5) 
Male       3.2 
       (2.1) 
Invest      8.5*** 9.5*** 
      (2.2) (2.2) 
AE 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 -0.7 -0.8 
 (3.3) (3.3) (3.4) (3.3) (3.3) (3.3) (3.3) 
Constant 49.8*** 48.0*** 50.0*** 49.7*** 49.6*** 45.9*** 39.4*** 
 (2.3) (3) (2.6) (2.4) (2.3) (2.5) (4.3) 






















Table E.20: Linear Regressions on “Reimburse” (Cross Country Comparisons) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 
China*SE .20** .19** .20** .20** .19** .18** .20** 
 (.08) (.08) (.08) (.08) (.08) (.08) (.08) 
China*AE .24*** .24*** .24*** .24*** .23*** .24*** .27*** 
 (.08) (.08) (.08) (.08) (.08) (.08) (.08) 
Risk Av.  .04     .07 
  (.06)     (.06) 
Prosocial   .02    .07 
   (.06)    (.07) 
Ineq. Av.    -.02   .07 
    (.07)   (.09) 
Comp.     .08  .14 
     (.08)  (.09) 
Male       .14** 
       (.05) 
Invest      .12** .16*** 
      (0.06) (.06) 
AE -.20** -.20** -.21** -.20** -.20** -.22** -.22** 
 (.08) (.08) (.08) (.08) (.08) (.08) (.08) 
Constant .49*** .46*** .48*** .49*** .48*** .43*** .21*** 
 (.06) (.08) (.07) (.06) (.06) (.06) (.11) 







Table E.21: Linear Regressions on “MWTA” (Cross Country Comparisons) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] 
China*SE 12.0*** 12.0*** 10.2** 12.0*** 11.1** 7.2* 5.6 
 (4.4) (4.5) (4.5) (4.5) (4.4) (4.4) (4.6) 
China*AE 7.0* 7.0* 5.8 7.0* 6.0 2.7 1.6 
 (4.1) (4.1) (4.1) (4.1) (4.1) (4) (4.1) 
Risk Av.  0.3     1.2 
  (3.5)     (3.3) 
Prosocial   -5.1    -4.8 
   (3.1)    (3.6) 
Ineq. Av.    1.4   0.3 
    (4.2)   (4.6) 
Comp.     8.0*  6.0 
     (4.2)  (4.6) 
Male       3.1 
       (2.8) 
Offer      0.4*** 0.4*** 
      (0.1) (0.1) 
AE 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.7 1.6 2.3 1.9 
 (4.6) (4.6) (4.6) (4.6) (4.6) (4.4) (4.4) 
Constant 46*** 45*** 49*** 45*** 45*** 26*** 26*** 
 (3.4) (4.2) (3.8) (3.4) (3.3) (5.6) (6.8) 




Notes: Panel I plots the US distribution of Offer for each endowment condition. Panel II plots the US distribution of MWTA for each endowment condition. 


















































Notes: Two-way scatter plot of MWTA conditional on Offer for US subjects. “Predicted MWTA” plots a fractional 
polynomial with Offer as the only independent variable.  























Notes: Panel I plots the China distribution of Offer for each endowment condition. Panel II plots the China distribution of MWTA for each endowment condition.  










































Notes: The China distribution of hold-up game outcomes are plotted above.  






















Notes: Two-way scatter plot of MWTA conditional on Offer for US subjects. “Predicted MWTA” plots a fractional 
polynomial with Offer as the only independent variable. 































APPENDIX B: ADDITIONAL TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table F.1: Endowment Conditions (SE, FH, and SL) 
 SE AE-FH AE-SL 
𝜔𝜔1  100 160 100 
𝜔𝜔2  100 100 40 
Notes: The table reports endowments provided to first and second movers across endowment conditions. “SE” 
denotes our symmetric endowment condition. “AE-FH” denotes our asymmetric endowment conditions in which 
the first mover’s endowment is increased relative to SE. “AE-SL” denotes our asymmetric endowment conditions 







Table F.2: US Data (FH and SL) 
 FH SL p-value K-S 
Invest 59.37% 50.00% (0.451) -- 
Offer 50.34 49.50 (0.603) (0.999) 
Reimburse 28.15% 28.15% (1.00)  
MWTA 48.74 45.62 (0.289) (0.408) 
Notes: Means for each strategy chosen by subjects in the hold-up game are reported above. Estimated test statistics 
compare values across treatment conditions with asterisks indicating their significance (p < 0.1*, < 0.05**, < 
0.01***). Each estimate associated with Invest is derived from a two-sample Fisher’s exact test of proportions. Each 







Table F.3: China Data (FH and SL) 
 FMH SML p-value K-S 
Invest 56.25% 52.08% (0.686) -- 
Offer 56.17 56.47 (0.997) (0.979) 
Reimburse 52.08% 52.08% (1.00)  
MWTA 54.29 54.28 (0.927) (0.695) 
Notes: Means for each strategy chosen by subjects in the hold-up game are reported above. 
Estimated test statistics compare values across treatment conditions with asterisks indicating 
their significance (p < 0.1*, < 0.05**, < 0.01***). Each estimate associated with Invest is derived 
from a two-sample Fisher’s exact test of proportions. Each estimate associated with Offer or 
MWTA are derived from two-sample Mann-Whitey rank-sum tests. 
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Table F.4: China and US Data (FH and SL) 
 H0: CFH = UFH H0: CSL = USL 
Invest (0.785) (0.857) 
Offer (0.050) (0.047) 
Reimburse (0.034) (0.034) 
MWTA (0.419) (0.038) 
Notes: p-values from estimated test statistics compare values across treatment conditions and are reported in 
parentheses. Each estimate associated with Invest is derived from a two-sample Fisher’s exact test of 





















1 56 56 (50%, 50 %) 4.5 4.2 
2 72 48 (50%, 50 %) 9.1 17.3 
3 88 40 (50%, 50 %) 30.3 24.4 
4 104 32 (50%, 50 %) 28.8 28.6 
5 120 24 (50%, 50 %) 12.1 15.5 
6 140 4 (50%, 50 %) 15.2 10.1 
Notes: Subjects were instructed to choose 1 of the 6 lotteries listed above. The degree of constant relative risk 
aversion (CRRA) associated with each lottery is as follows: [Lottery 1 | 3.46 < r], [Lottery 2 | 1.16 < r  < 3.46], 
[Lottery 3 | 0.71 < r < 0.16], Lottery 4 | 0.50 < r , 0.71], Lottery 5 | 0 < r < 0.50], [Lottery 6 | r < 0].  Variable 


























(% Option B) 
China 
(% Option B) 
1 (48, 48) (48, 24) 14.4 27.3 
2 (48, 48) (48, 32) 18.9 34.5 
3 (48, 48) (48, 40) 18.9 43.5 
4 (48, 48) (48, 56) 66.7 48.8 
5 (48, 48) (48, 64) 65.2 39.9 
6 (48, 48) (48, 72) 63.6 34.5 
Notes:  Subjects were instructed to state whether you prefer Option A or Option B for each row. Variable 
‘Competitive’ = 1 if the subjects chose Option B for Decisions 1-3 and Option A for Decisions 4-6.  Variable 
‘Prosocial’ = 1 if the subjects chose Option A for Decisions 1-3 and Option B for Decisions 4-6.  Variable 
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𝜔𝜔1 – 60 + θ   𝜔𝜔1 – 60 




Notes: Figure B.2 plots the distribution of Offer conditional on investment decision in each treatment. 
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